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1. Foundations of Marxist Communication Studies 
Historical materialism, to be understood as a theoretically and empirically oriented 
approach to scientific work that emerges from a societal-practice, is governed by 
principles that are based on the following insight: The way in which human beings se-
cure their means of existence at a given level of societal development, and the ar-
rangements they make required to secure this existence, forms the material sub-
strate of any given organisation of societal life. Here, it should be noted 
 
that the actual life-process [Lebensprozess], the point of departure and prima-
ry process to be analysed, is not a mere theoretical assumption [Denkan-
nahme]. The minimal requirement of scientific thought is that this point of de-
parture is adopted. Those who contests that thinking, too, depends on food, 
should try to disprove this materialist thesis – which, from an idealist perspec-
tive, is also but a ‘theoretical assumption’ – using themselves as a subject. 
They would become the laughing stock of all humanity (Haug 1973, 562). 
When seen as the point of departure (and target) of scientific work and as the basis 
of the concrete formation of all aspects and relations of societal life, the actual life-
process actualises itself as a specific mode of production, which always exists as a 
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historically-specific entity formed by productive forces and relations of production. 
The mode of production – the connection between the form and quality of the socie-
tal production of the goods and services required to secure a living – is the founda-
tion upon which all human abilities develop. 
 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite re-
lations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production ap-
propriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of pro-
duction. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social conscious-
ness. (Marx 1859, 263). 
This makes ‘labour’ the decisive category of historical-materialist research. To be 
more accurate: human labour in its societally determined form; labour as a compre-
hensive process of what is in every case a concrete historical manifestation of the 
societal and individual mode of existence of people (Sandkühler 1972, 982-83). For 
the history of human labour, “the history of industry and the established objective ex-
istence of industry are the open book of man’s essential powers, the perceptibly ex-
isting human psychology” (Marx 1844, 302). This means that for historical-materialist 
research “[I]ndividuals producing in society – hence socially determined individual 
production” (Marx 1857/58, 5) – has to be the point of departure and this has also 
shaped historical materialism’s conception of society. Society, in this sense, is de-
fined as a 
 
specific, historically concrete system of societal relations that is shaped by 
principles and that humans enter. The foundational component of these socie-
tal relations is the economic system, that is, the system of the relations of pro-
duction, which, in turn, corresponds to a specific developmental stage of pro-
ductive forces (Eichhorn et al. 1969, 145). 
The category “economic formation of society” is thus the basic concept of historical 
materialist research. What reveals itself in this category, and this – it must be em-
phatically stressed: not merely in a truncated economic sense – is that societal pro-
duction is the decisive aspect of the totality of production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption. Further, as such it acts as the material basis of the formation of society 
as a whole. As employed here, the phrase “the economic formation of society” thus 
means two things at once: “the shape the core [Kerngestalt] of a real, developing so-
cietal system has assumed” and the “abstract image of this core as the basic notion 
critical theory employs when it addresses this real system” (Ritsert 1973, 35). This 
idea of the core (“core” is here to be understood as a “concept”) emerges from inter-
pretations that concern 1. constitutive principles; 2. the possible developments; and 
3. the prospects for an active transformation of the organization of societal life, both 
in general and in the specific. Ultimately, the core, the “economic formation of socie-
ty”, is captured in the analysis of a given form of production. Because of this, the 
concept of a core provides the focal point by means of which all aspects of the refer-
ential connections that are to be theoretically established and empirically corroborat-
ed become apparent. 
Thus, the core-concept “economic formation of society” allows all aspects of “a 
rich totality of determinations and relations” (Marx 1857/58, 100), which are at work in 
the real formation of the social, to be traced back onto the true core structure of the 
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specific form of production in question. 
The notion of a core, which the category “economic formation of society” entails, 
allows society to be analysed as an integral system [ganzheitliches System], in its 
elements and structure, and with regards to the principles shaping its structure and 
its development. In this manner, one can recognise that society is a unified, albeit 
contradictory, organisation of human life with an identifiable stage of development. 
Society emerges as an organisation that envelops all forms and sectors of human 
activity by means of the reciprocal interactions that unify it and by means of the prev-
alent mode of production that defines it. Thus, society is to be understood as “the 
systematic totality of practical societal relationships that individuals enter into 
amongst themselves in a historically concrete process of production and life-process” 
(Eichhorn et al. 1969, 189). 
These societal relations, which initially enter the analysis as a “historical bloc” 
(Gramsci), can be understood, on the one hand, as material relations (which are for 
the most parts identical with the relations of production) or, on the other hand, as 
ideological relations. Because they determine and provide the foundational relations, 
the relations of production and class relations must be the primary relations, which 
are the necessary result of a specific stage in the development of the productive 
forces. On this basis, one can speak of society in a scientifically grounded manner, in 
categories belonging to a theory of the economic formation of society. This means: 
society is a material system, in terms of general system-theory [allgemeine Sys-
temtheorie]. Accordingly, the historical-materialist conception of society must include 
both aspects the term ‘system’ entails: the active components (the individuals, who 
mobilise their productive forces and create multiple societal relations), and also, the 
structure of the system (the totality of the underlying relations that takes shape and 
which humans enter into between and with one another). What emerges from this 
foundational, materialist idea, is, that „the determining factor in history is, in the last 
resort, the production and reproduction of immediate life” (Engels 1882–89, xv). This, 
however, does not mean that “the economic position is the cause and that it alone is 
active while everything else is mere passive effect, but rather that there is reciprocal 
action based, in the final analysis, on economic necessity which invariably prevails” 
(Engels 1894, 265). 
This reiterates again, how historical materialism relates societal relations as a 
whole back to the relations of production, which, in turn, are grounded in a specific 
level of development of productive forces – these deductions make the real dialectic 
movement of history visible. One the one hand, history is in this sense perceived as 
an objectively-determined process with objective principles – a process that takes 
shape in the emergence, growth and transformation of the (economic) societal-
formations that are established in the context of the reciprocal interaction between 
the conditions of production and the productive forces. On the other hand, history is 
also perceived as a process that entails objective principles that only establish them-
selves in the form conveyed by what humans do in practice – be it in the form of a 
more or less primordial, interaction [Stoffwechsel] between the human and nature, in 
which the human and nature as such, and consequently their societal quality, are 
defined, or be it in the form of a conscious class struggle and a methodologically pro-
pelled social revolution. 
With regards to the image historical-materialist research has of itself, especially as 
a social science, and also in its relationship to its object, it must thus see its point of 
departure in materially active humans – in their material life-process, the “production 
of ideas” (Marx and Engels 1846, 36) and the genesis and development of the “ideo-
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logical reflexes and echoes” (Ibid.) belonging to this life-process. It must deduce its 
findings from this process itself and explain it in doing so. 
  
Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active 
men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive 
forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. 
Consciousness [das Bewusstsein] can never be anything else than conscious 
being [das bewusste Sein], and the being of men is their actual life-process. 
(Ibid.) 
Because it is not a linear, one-dimensional causal relation that is being propagated 
here, it must again be reiterated that the aim is the exposition of a connection be-
tween material and ideal production. This connection consists of a process of mutual 
constitution. This process of constitution combines two elements in a dialectic struc-
ture. 1. The fact that the interaction between the human and nature is “an eternal 
natural necessity which mediates …life itself” (Marx 1867, 133); 2. the other element 
is described in Marx’s example of the builder: 
 
what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the archi-
tect builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of eve-
ry labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the 
worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a 
change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [verwirklicht] his 
own purpose in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it de-
termines the mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subor-
dinate his will to it. (Ibid., 284) 
With the ability of human beings to mentally anticipate [ideelle Antizipation] the result 
of labour – an ability which took shape in the course of the “hominization of the ape” 
(Engels) – the human labour-process obtains a specific dimension of consciousness 
(the human labour-process is here understood to be an interaction between human 
and nature that is undertaken co-operatively and based on a division of labour). The 
human ability to consciously plan the labour process and its outcome makes it possi-
ble that the conditions of the material production of human existence, which are 
found in nature, can be transformed into artificially produced [gemachte] conditions. 
Such a transformation, in turn, is only possible in the form of a societal process – a 
process in which the form of society that emerges and develops is shaped by the 
amalgamation [Verschränkung] of the human engagement with nature and the way in 
which humans interact amongst themselves. In this way, the human power of con-
sciousness, and the corresponding mental anticipation of the course and outcome of 
production, allows the species ‘human’ to societally organize the production of its ma-
terial existence because this leads to the cumulative acquisition of societal experi-
ence. This, in turn, is the precondition for the further, potentially unlimited, acquisition 
and utilization of the possibilities provided by nature [in der Natur angelegte Möglich-
keiten]. The ability to societally organize the interaction between ‘the human and na-
ture’ on account of the accumulation of societal experience, can thus be seen to pro-
vide a more precise classification of the human power of consciousness and the 
mental anticipation of the course and outcome of production. In order to speak of the 
human power of consciousness and mental anticipation in a more precise manner 
still, one needs to emphasize that: it is necessarily the case, that in its concrete struc-
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ture, all knowledge about the interaction between ‘the human and nature’ can only 
develop in a mediated fashion, and this to the degree in which the possibilities pro-
vided by nature have become conscious as attributes that contribute to the determi-
nation of the aim toward which the process of interaction unfolds. One can thus state: 
1. as an always already societal process of production and re-production of the mate-
rial conditions of human life, the interaction between ‘the human and nature’ evidently 
depends on the scope and quality of the knowledge about possibilities provided na-
ture; such knowledge is potentially unlimited, for it is not attained individually, but by 
society. It is equally evident that the scope and quality of the knowledge about the 
possibilities for the societal organisation of human life that nature provides depend on 
the scope and level of planning in which the power of consciousness is actualised in 
the form of concrete knowledge in the course of the interaction between ‘the human 
and nature’. The power of consciousness, and the ideal anticipation of the natural 
world they are distinct from, gives humans 
 
a relative degree of independence. But this does not mean that humans can 
step outside of this connection to nature. Their ‘independence’, rather, exclu-
sively consists in the ability to remodel the given natural world in line with hu-
man needs. This, in turn, is only possible if humans take account of this rela-
tionship whilst remodelling nature by adhering to the laws that organise nature. 
If the ideal anticipation of the result of labour is to stand up to the demands of 
reality – if the theoretical dimension of the labour process is to correspond to 
its practical dimension – then the work of establishing the connection between 
the human and nature, must, as a final consequence, contribute to the con-
scious design of the form the interaction with nature takes (Hoffmann 
1974/1975. 3). 
The relationship between labour and knowledge [Erkenntnis] addressed here – more 
specifically, the problem of the concrete consciousness that unfolds in the course of 
the development of the process of interaction between ‘the human and nature’ – can 
be summed up into an ambivalent thesis: on the one hand, the constitution of con-
crete consciousness cannot be assigned a dynamic of generation of its own that 
necessarily governs the development of consciousness; on the other hand, it cannot 
be ruled out that, in the course of human history, this constitution of concrete con-
sciousness is subjected to an external dynamic, a dynamic which then determines 
the way this consciousness develops. This can happen because the growing sum of 
cumulative societal experience at some point leads to a qualitative leap in the way 
concrete consciousness unfolds; or because a point at which the dynamisation and 
systematisation of the societal process of experience become inevitable is reached 
prior to this, because experiences acquired by chance no longer suffice to make use 
of the possibilities provided by nature in the production of human life. The second 
point, especially, leads to the following plausible insight about human history: “if, in its 
main tendencies, the societal process in its entirety is not informed by a form of 
knowledge and by a praxis governed by knowledge that matches the concrete level 
of its historical development, this ultimately leads to the unavoidable stagnation and 
decay of human societal life (Holzkamp 1973, 170). If one follows this thesis to re-
construct the development of labour and knowledge as interrelated societal process-
es across history, one can demonstrate that the isolation of facts and the isolated 
observation of specific facts and problems are initially the only available means to 
attain relatively reliable knowledge about nature as humans encounter it. Further, the 
362  Horst Holzer 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2018. 
isolation of facts is also the only means by which this knowledge can be communi-
cated between subjects and made available to society. Thus, concrete conscious-
ness is limited by the specific, because the actual way in which ‘the human and na-
ture’ relate to one another can only be represented in a disjointed, particularistic 
manner. This limitation of concrete consciousness can be recognised the very mo-
ment the labour process itself, and especially its societal nature, become the object 
of conscious examination once a certain stage in the development of the productive 
force of human labour is reached. With an examination of this kind – but especially 
with the realisation that labour is itself merely another form in which the connection 
between the human and nature finds expression – a foundation for concrete con-
sciousness of this connection itself is established: it allows for societal experience 
that pertains to single observational facts, but which can be converted – albeit in a 
methodological-systematic manner – into scientific knowledge that attempts to classi-
fy the single phenomenon through the reconstruction of the underling connection 
(Sandkühler 1973, XLII ff.). Admittedly, when the means to acquire scientific 
knowledge are obtained, its necessity is of course not yet established. But in prac-
tice, the isolating, particularizing treatment of facts and problems given in experience 
become an obstruction the moment the societally produced labour process that has 
developed no longer allows for the disjointed accumulation of societal experience: 
when the societal quality of the labour process itself – in its theoretical dimension and 
practical efficiency – presses for the reconstruction of the correlation between single 
phenomena. At first, ‘reconstructing the correlation’ means reconstructing the transi-
tions that link single phenomena into a potentially contradictory whole. 
 
Dialectical theory establishes connections between what appears to be sepa-
rate in intuition [zwischen unmittelbar Getrenntem] and it seeks to trace the 
real connections where, as a consequence, this trace has been erased. The 
object of dialectics is not the interior life of humans, but the internal correlation 
of the world in its motion. A theory is dialectical when it studies this correlation 
in a particular example and aims to generalise the findings (Haug 1973, 563). 
If this reconstruction of the correlation between single phenomena is not to end up as 
a mere list of single particles of knowledge, then what is common to all single phe-
nomena must act as the focal point both of such reconstructive activity and the nev-
ertheless indispensable epistemological examination of the single phenomenon. This 
means: because societally produced labour is at the heart of human life and because 
it has been recognised as the variable that supports the connection between ‘the 
human and nature’ in all its consequences, the system of societally produced labour 
can and must act as the basis for the acquisition of methodical knowledge about the 
possibilities governing the development of societal life, possibilities that nature pro-
vides and which are developed in the course of human history. 
With this, the core methodological requirement of materialist research, especially 
as it is practiced in the social sciences, has been established: the requirement, 
namely, that scientific knowledge in the strict sense – using the example of sociologi-
cal research – distinguishes itself in that single observational facts pertaining to a 
given formation of society are understood by means of their correlation to their struc-
tural conditions. This requirement has profound implications for epistemology and 
social theory. First, one must note  
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that (the reconstruction of societal correlations – H. H.) is a theoretical system 
that aims at the conceptual, theoretical representation of reality, namely, of 
society in its entirety and of society as a system. The theoretical system mir-
rors the inner structure of the real system of society, the systematic connection 
of its elements … Every empirical study invariably deals with a section, an in-
stance, an aspect of the entire society [Gesamtgesellschaft]. It is impossible to 
conduct an empirical study of the entire society in a single study. This is the 
case, because the empirical reality of society as a system is reproduced as a 
‘theoretical system’, as a conceptual-totality, as a product of thought. Already 
the circumstance that the empirical manifestation of society does not disclose 
the inner structure of the systematization that must be worked out by means of 
abstraction makes it impossible to account for society by empirical means 
(Hahn 1968, 87). 
To respond to the question of what this abstraction (which is in fact a concretion) en-
tails, and to show more clearly how the scientific reconstruction of an (economic) 
formation of society is conducted, it is necessary to define the methodology of mate-
rialist social science and materialist sociology in greater detail. Three points with 
considerable implications for the methodology of materialist research are to be dis-
cussed: 
 
1. The demand that societal phenomena are related to the historically concrete for-
mation of the relations of production and that they are related to the core economic 
structure to which these phenomena need to be seen to belong. 
2. The demand that the determinants specific to the formation of given societal phe-
nomena are established and deduced from these phenomena. The focal point of 
the analysis is here the directly or indirectly mediated connection between societal 
phenomena and the system of societally produced labour. 
3. The demand that societal phenomena are to be exposed in their correlation to the 
foundational laws of a given societal correlation in a way that can lead to the sen-
sible, methodical development of a societal praxis that is guided by scientific 
knowledge. 
 
The following example can serve to illustrate the analytic-method of materialist re-
search: 
 
It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real 
precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the 
foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on 
closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave 
out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn 
are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. 
E.g. wage labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, divi-
sion of labour, prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labour, 
without value, money, price etc. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, 
this would be a chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole, and I would 
then, by means of further determination, move analytically towards ever more 
simple concepts [Begriff], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner ab-
stractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the 
journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population 
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again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich to-
tality of many determinations and relations. (Marx 1857/58, 100) 
The methodology by means of which social scientific knowledge can be attained thus 
entails attention to ‘actual’, given phenomena and breaking these phenomena down 
into their main determinants in order to establish the internal relation of these deter-
minants. This means, it entails developing abstractions and exposing how the com-
ponents of these abstractions can sublate specific manifestations of these abstrac-
tions in order to theoretically reconstruct the general validity of these abstractions 
and present what is ‘concretely’ given as a structured totality of determinations and 
relations. “The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determi-
nations, hence unity of the diverse. [...] [T]he method of rising from the abstract to the 
concrete is […] the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as 
the concrete in the mind.” (Marx 1857/58, 101). One must thus distinguish between 
that which really exists as the given precondition the subject of the epistemological 
process must draw on, and the elaboration of the concrete totality of that which really 
exists in the form of “a totality of thoughts, concrete in thought” (Ibid.). Returning to 
the earlier example, this means that insight [Erkenntnis] gained from social science 
cannot arrive at a point at which single abstract determinants [Bestimmungen] are 
isolated through the analysis of an actually existing, and in a non-materialistic sense, 
‘concrete’ population, for these abstractions to become the basis for increasingly po-
rous abstractions. By means of continually relating these abstractions back to the 
“given, concrete, living whole” (Ibid.) this totality, rather, must be conceived as being 
concrete in the mind, as a totality in thought, because of these determinants. Taking 
the historical quality, the actual historical genesis of what exists into account, the 
methodology outlined here is also defined as a logical-historical or structural-genetic 
procedure. By exposing that the steps in the historical development of this real exist-
ence are part of a pragmatically-necessary process, this procedure seeks to estab-
lish the rank, meaning and effect of the issue being analysed within the reconstructed 
system of a societal formation (Holzkamp 1974, 33ff.).  
The methodology of materialist research, which literally asks for the ‘development 
of an object’ [‘Gegenstands-Entwicklung’] has been recapitulated as follows by 
means of the example of the critique of the political economy of bourgeois [bürger-
lich] society: 
 
materialist research develops its object by first breaking things down into … 
what is logically speaking elementary, into what is most basic [das Einfachste], 
which is, genetically speaking, also the first element. Through this analysis, it 
exposes the rules – because these are pragmatically necessary – by means of 
which this most basic element develops into complex [zusammengesetzte, i.e. 
composite] forms. Materialist research is the successive progression from 
what is initially simple to the complex, from the abstract-and-general to the 
concrete-and-specific. When abstracted from all specific forms, the commodity 
form of the product of labour and labour in the form of value-producing-labour 
remain as the universal, basic forms of bourgeois society. What the critique of 
the political economy thus manages to achieve, by gradually progressing from 
the basic to the most complex, is a gapless extrapolation of all forms of value. 
From the commodity, it arrives at the labour that produces the commodity, 
then it turns to the simplest forms of value to develop the formal properties of 
money and capital. From the capital-form it arrives at the universal and ab-
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stract form of capitalist labour in the form of commodity production. By its es-
sence, this is a form of labour that produces surplus value, because the accu-
mulation of value is the sole end toward which the capitalist employs waged 
labourers. From this still entirely abstract but foundational form of labour as the 
production of surplus value (which is common to all concrete manifestations of 
capitalist labour), the critique then progresses genetically until it reaches phe-
nomena we know from our everyday reality, phenomena that fit into the empir-
ical categories that our society lives in (Haug 1974, 186). 
Because one has comprehended this reality in terms of the societal-structure holding 
it together and the historical becoming of this structure in order to arrive at everyday 
reality in this way, one can say that the reproduction of what really exists in thought 
provides a mirror-image of this reality; a mirror image that is to be understood as a 
reconstruction, in thought, of the intrinsic, constitutive, necessary universal internal 
and external determinants, relations and developments. Thus, this mirror image can 
precisely not be understood to represent a flat likeness of what really exists. 
It is obvious that this mode of representation cannot be accused of attempting the 
same thing as photography. For 
 
basically, dialectical materialism’s theory of representation [Wieder-
spieglungstheorie] applies the deterministic principle in its dialectic-materialist 
mode (whereby external causes are seen to work through the internal precon-
ditions) to the epistemological process. Every process is determined by exter-
nal, objective conditions, which are refracted by the constitutive laws shaping 
a given internal process. This also holds for the epistemological pro-
cess…Thought is determined by its object, but the object does not determine 
thought directly, but by means of mediation through the activity thinking con-
sists of (analysis, synthesis, abstraction and generalisation). This activity re-
fashions [umformen] sensual data, which do not expose the essential charac-
teristics of the object in their pure form, and leads to the reestablishment of the 
object in thought (Rubinstein 1968, 37). 
The emphatic reiteration of the following point will further clarify this line of argument. 
The constitution of the objects and subjects that are to yield scientific knowledge, and 
the constitution of scientific cognitive activity itself, are bound to the socially organ-
ised interaction between ‘the human and nature’ and are bound to the development 
of the correlation of labour and knowledge in a historical process. 
 
We all act and think within a world that is materially determined. But all asser-
tions about this material configuration of nature [Naturzusammenhang], which 
also forms the basis of history, are contingent on a historical process of consti-
tution in which humans attempt to release themselves from this natural config-
uration. I cannot imagine a form of knowledge that is not mediated by objects 
that were made by humans. A materialist dialectic, and the knowledge based 
on this dialectic, cannot abstract from these objects that are determined by the 
constitutive-interrelation [Konstitutionszusammenhang] of social praxis, as little 
as it can abstract from the material character of the world (Negt 1969, 127-
128). 
The thesis of the materiality of the world does not imply, therefore, that the historical 
character of knowledge is questioned, or that knowledge is not seen as contingent on 
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the societal context [Zusammenhang], which is in equal measures constitutive of the 
human appropriation of nature and the ideal reconstruction and practical manipula-
tion of natural and societal processes. Quite the opposite: only the amalgamation of 
the thesis of the materiality of the world with the theoretically constituted argument 
outlining the societal genesis and determination of human knowledge clarifies the 
axiom that “[t]he standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the 
theory of knowledg” (Lenin 1972, 161). This – as opposed to any positivistic-
representational conception of representation – can only mean that when pursuing 
historical-materialist lines of argument, one must always be aware of the societally 
conditioned relations of humans to nature, of the historical process of the transfor-
mation of nature by humans, and the historical character of knowledge and of scien-
tific categories, concepts and terms, the terms ‘nature’ and ‘matter’ included.  
 
As a form of matter as it exists for humans, nature is no longer merely matter 
‘as such’, but matter ‘for us’. It is always an element of the interaction with na-
ture that takes the form of individual-societal labour. It only makes sense to 
speak of matter in terms of nature for humans as beings that reproduce them-
selves through labour. The categories of the knowledge of nature are functions 
of historical, societal labour on and in nature; they are historical and societal 
categories, which do not belong to ‘nature itself’ (Sandkühler 1972, 986).  
This must have repercussions for the truth-claims of materialist science: scientific 
knowledge in terms of historical materialism is not objectively true because a given, 
non-subjective substance [Materie] appears in the form of true assertions and is fixed 
in a static, unchangeable image that stands apart from the constitutive societal con-
text; objective truth, rather, consists in the fact that, for us, this non-subjective sub-
stance is only ever given through a societal process of constitution – this means, it is 
only ever given in the medium of language and action, argumentation and communi-
cation. In a medium, therefore, that is itself not an objective image of rigidly operative 
laws, but one that must assume a socially determined form. This is true for 
knowledge of nature as much as it is true for the knowledge of society. In both cases, 
it is inevitable that: 
 
truth cannot […] be established by means of a theory that presumes truth to 
reside in an ontological given. It can only be established by means of a theory 
that responds to the demand to substantiate its claim within the medium in 
which truth is important not only as an epistemological, but also a vital interest: 
in the medium of language, action and praxis (Leist 1973, 607). 
The discussion up to here can be summed up in the following propositions; proposi-
tions, which cannot be adequately assessed without the detailed elucidation that was 
provided above: 
 
1. Societal life only exists as the totality of societal relations which individuals enter 
and are part of. The structure of these relations turns societal life into a societal-
formation and it gives the interaction between ‘the human and nature’ a societal 
form. 
2. Within the totality of societal relations, the relations of production – and in these 
the shape the economic core assumes – function as the determinants shaping the 
process of formation; the contradictory unity [Einheit] of societal formations 
emerges from the dialectic of the relations of production and the productive forces 
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that underpin it, a dialectic which itself continuously produces the elements that 
propel it on. 
3. By their very nature, individual subjects of a societal formation and observable 
facts relating to it are embodiments of the ensemble of societal relations. In this 
sense, they are specific representatives of the given societal formation. 
4. As integral parts of the ensemble of societal relations, the individual subjects of 
this societal formation and the observable facts relating to it are linked by constitu-
tive, pragmatically necessary connections. These, in turn, are based on the central 
patterns of development and motion of a given economic societal formation and its 
core [Kerngestalt]. 
  
Within the framework thus established, ‘societal communication’ becomes an essen-
tial aspect of historical materialist research because it represents a system of under-
lying societal principles [Gesetzmässigkeiten] that not only have important organising 
functions for the formation of society in its entirety and in its parts, but also have con-
stitutive functions. Two reciprocally related aspects of ‘societal communication’, 
which are bound together dialectically, must be analysed here: on the one hand, the 
role it plays in the process of mastering nature by means of human cooperation 
needs to be analysed; on the other hand, the role it plays in the process of societal 
and interpersonal debate and communication. Both processes need to be viewed as 
special sides of the constitutive-correlation of society that develops historically. This 
means, that the societal labour process as the primary sector of societal life and the 
genesis, quality and function of communication are functionally and genetically inter-
related. This has the following implications for a materialist analysis of societal com-
munication: 
 
the communication of individuals can only be explained from within societal re-
lations, if these individuals are 1. presented as social beings or as ensembles 
of social circumstances and 2. if these circumstances are grasped as social 
qualities, traits and determinations of individuals, qualities that are the mere 
result of the socially conducted engagement [Auseinandersetzung] with nature 
(Eichhorn et al. 1969, 247). 
More precisely: because phenomena pertaining to communication in a sense repre-
sent sociality as such, they are shaped both by immediate determinations of a socie-
tal labour process that assumes a given form and by determinants that – in some 
form – have an intermediate relationship to this labour process. In order to develop 
the problematic, the following sections thus examine this interrelation in order to ex-
plain the dialectical composition [Verschränkung] of its general and specific aspects. 
2. Communication and Society in Capitalism 
In order to expose the key elements of materialistic research in communication, this 
chapter will open with a discussion of the connection between labour, knowledge and 
communication by means of an argument comprised of comprehensible abstractions. 
In a next step, the section asks what concrete forms the analysis of capitalistic com-
modity production such an abstract determination of communication leads to. 
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2.1. Work, Knowledge, Communication 
The societal appropriation of the possibilities provided by nature is the precondition of 
the processes of reproduction and development that shape societal life as a whole. 
Because of this, the instruments that are used and developed during the interaction 
between humans and are the original and foundational information media. Further, as 
the various natural things have different meaning and importance for the existence 
and evolution of societal relations, they must be fixed in linguistic expressions to be-
come reproducible in the mind and communicative.  
 
(Language) develops out of the material satisfaction of needs and the necessi-
ty of societal communication; primarily, however, and this is closely related to 
this, it develops out of labour. Linguistic relations characterise empirical expe-
riential-data pertaining to production; what satisfies a need leaves an imprint 
on the brain and receives a name later on. Linguistic classifications necessari-
ly correspond to a certain level of the production process. Language is a me-
dium that helps facilitate [ein Hilfsmittel] the material reproduction of life 
(Erckenbrecht 1973, 146-147). 
This means that all natural objects that are enveloped by human praxis attain a spe-
cific societal significance and turn into communicative signs, which go on to form the 
objective foundations of the process of communication. During this transformation – 
and this is the decisive problem ‘communication-theory’ isolates – these mediating 
signs are themselves mediated in a specific manner. The problem is to be located 
here, because it is in this dialectical amalgamation of labour, knowledge and com-
munication that the interaction between ‘humans and nature’ becomes visible as an 
action that has a communicative and co-operative quality. It is in the performance of 
this action that humans emerge as societal beings, whose progressive societalisation 
leads to – and shapes – the appropriation of nature (Leithäuser 1965, 148-149). 
 
Human objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit], as it takes shape in an engagement 
with nature, is always already mediated by an intersubjective objectivity, by the 
engagement of humans with humans: speaking and thinking are societal activ-
ities. As such, they are the mark of objective relations in which human subjects 
no longer apprehend one another as nature but as intentionally acting beings. 
It is through this apprehension that they posit themselves as societal beings 
(Leist 1973, 590). 
The perspective materialistic research opens on communication hinges on the consti-
tutive role communication plays in the formation and development of sociality (com-
munication is here of course also bound up with labour- and epistemological pro-
cesses). “We must bear in mind […] that man's relation to himself only becomes for 
him objective and actual through his relation to the other man” (Marx 1844, 278).  
To allow for a better comprehension of this key element of a materialistic definition 
of communication, the genesis and function of communication in the context of so-
cially organised material life will be described in detail. The question if, and in what 
form, communicative activities can also be detected in the realm of non-human or-
ganisms must be our point of departure, and the role of these activities in sustaining 
the life of these organisms must be established. The following three pointers can 
provide a general answer: 1. The realm of non-human organisms is marked by the 
formation of specific corporeal systems – in higher animals also psycho-corporeal 
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systems – that are to ensure that these organisms attain an appropriate, i.e., life-
sustaining orientation in the environment they inhabit. 2. These so-called receptor-
systems, primarily enable the formation of reciprocal relations between organisms, 
and as such these relations are communicative. 3. These communicative activities 
contribute to the orientation of organisms, and orientation is an activity that serves to 
increase their survival chances. The survival chance of a given organism does not 
only increase because of a general correlation between the organism and demands 
its environment places upon its orientation; the chance also and especially increases 
because of a specific correspondence between this organism and the specific com-
municative-demands its environment places upon it. This means, in summary: 
 
the sensual organs do not merely comprise of some chance properties that, 
amongst many other things, also allow them to apprehend other organisms. 
Rather, the evolution of sensual organs in the course of natural history is from 
the very outset directed toward the adequate communicative reception of other 
organisms (Holzkamp 1973, 77-78). 
In contrast to development of non-human organisms in natural history, which exclu-
sively pertains to survival in a certain environment, the societal-historical motion of 
humans is founded in societally organized labour.  
 
Societal work is a human activity that creates objects [vergegenständlichende 
Arbeit], an activity, during which the environment is changed in response to 
human interests and needs through a planned intervention. These interests 
and needs evolve ever further in the course of the societal development that is 
effected by labour. The process of exteriorisation the human undertakes 
through labour that creates objects also entails the internalisation of the ob-
jects that result from societal labour, an internalisation that unfolds by means 
of individual appropriation of these objects. This intersection of reification and 
appropriation which leads to the historical preservation, transmission and cu-
mulative valorisation of societal experience is the basis of societal-historical 
progress (Ibid., 105). 
As already indicated above, the defining aspect of this societal process of labour is 
the anticipation of the result of labour in thought and that the production and use of 
tools respond to this anticipated outcome. Put otherwise: in the relationship between 
aim (outcome) and means (tool) that the process of societal labour necessarily en-
tails, the use of an object as a tool is not a mere product of the current use to which 
the tool is being put – as is the case in the highest animal species – above all, it re-
lates tool production to a potential, generalised use (not bound to a given situation). 
Viewed historically, this means that during the transition from the highest forms of 
animal organisms – the pongids – to the hominids via the subhuman hominids, the 
production of tools for a more general use prevails over tool use that is merely bound 
to a given situation. With this, the character [Natur] of the subhuman hominids devel-
ops into the societal character of human beings. As the ‘human’ level of the societal 
production of tools is reached, the world of humans for the most part consists of 
products of human labour, of products, in which specific generalised aims, possible 
uses and use-values have assumed the form of an object.  
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As manifest elements of the world [Welttatbestände], use-values in the form of 
objects distinguish themselves from other given entities on the basis that here 
general human aims attain an object based sensual form. Thus, use-values in 
the form of objects are ‘meaningful’ for human orientation because the ‘mean-
ing’ they embody is realised by human labour (Holzkamp 1973, 118).  
In this sense, the societal labour process that turns human needs and abilities into 
‘meaningful’ objects and the tangible product of labour that emerges through the es-
tablishment of a connection between the factual meaning of objects [sachliche Ge-
genstandsbedeutungen] are the distinguishing marks of ‘human’ life. The recognition 
of this dimension of meaning inherent to the process and outcome of labour, is thus 
the decisive aspect of human orientation. As a process that primarily entails the 
senses, it involves the appropriate perception of the meaning of objects that are pre-
sent to the senses. Such perception of object-related meaning – or, more precisely, 
of objectively-meaningful elements of the world [Welttatbeständen] – is thus one of 
the necessary pre-conditions for the existence of the material production and repro-
duction of societal life. This has the following two implications: on the one hand, it 
gestures toward the ability to conceive of generality, i.e., of the general use-value 
that assumes objective form in the labour process, a use-value that is not bound to a 
specific situation; on the other hand, this means that single object-related meanings – 
which take shape as the societal process of production develops and the general 
aims that determine it become entwined – condense into structures-of-meaning. The 
second point, especially, forcefully raises a point, which was left aside whilst the 
problematic of the factual meaning of objects was being introduced, namely: the con-
nection between factual and personal meanings of objects; or, when seen on the lev-
el of epistemological and communication-processes: the relation between the per-
ception of objects in the narrow sense and interpersonal perception and cognition 
[interpersonale Wahrnehmung]. 
This reiterates, as already outlined, that the process of societal labour comprises 
of two elements: the interaction with nature, which, in turn, is always already mediat-
ed by the relations that humans form amongst each other. It is this mediation by in-
terpersonal relationships within which (in the narrow and broad sense) production 
unfolds that establishes the meanings of objects as societal meanings, whilst simul-
taneously embedding them into the context of personal meanings that designate sub-
jects and can be perceived in objects. This context is primarily established because 
societal labour takes place as collaboration, as co-operation, as a communal produc-
tion of use values in the form of objects [Gebrauchswert-Vergegenständlichungen]. 
The thesis that societal labour forms the basis of any form of organisation of societal 
life can thus be further specified: the actual and potential structures of co-operation 
that turn into objects (as a product of labour) are the vehicle by means of which the 
material historical process unfolds. As such, these structures of co-operation are the 
rudimentary-form of the relations of production that connect working humans to each 
other in their relation to nature and thus form the constitutive- (and communicative-) 
connection between the human and nature and also the interaction between the two. 
 
The development of hominids and the degree to which it enters the ‘human’ 
stage, and, correspondingly, the degree to which the environment is shaped 
by the products of labour that creates objects (which includes the perceptual 
recognition of the meanings these objects have attained) also makes the activ-
ities and associated constitutions of other human beings objectively meaning-
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ful. That is to say, the activities of other human beings form a polar, indissolu-
ble, real connection to the meaning of objects: Once the meaning of things 
makes it possible to perceive that the products of labour embody general hu-
man aims that are to be realised through human activity (aims that respond to 
the objective requirements necessary to sustain a given form of societal life), 
then the personal meaning things attain allow one to recognise that the other 
person is determined by the general aims that are objectified or need to be ob-
jectified in order to sustain societal life (this determination happens by means 
of activities that are related to the generation and use of products of labour 
and the dispositions these activities give rise to). (Holzkamp 1973, 141).  
Interpersonal relation – i.e., perception, communication, activity – is thus from the 
outset not merely a relation between two human beings, it rather represents a gen-
eral societal relation, in which the factual and personal meanings of things form a 
referential-context that connects humans and things, things and humans, relations 
between humans and relations between things, relations between things and rela-
tions between humans. Put concisely and succinctly, this means nothing other than: 
humans produce communicatively and communicate productively and thereby they 
create the unity of their relation to nature and to each other (Kästle 1972, 129). 
This, in turn, means that the process of productive-cooperative sustainment is 
necessarily contingent on the development and emergence of symbolic-linguistic 
modes of interpretation and communication; although, viewed historically, the sym-
bolic-linguistic only develops in the course of the expansion and differentiation labour 
processes that produce objects (in the stage of communicative-orientation it only ex-
ists its germinal state in the personal and factual meanings of objects). This has spe-
cial relevance, because the formation of a symbolic-linguistic dimension definitely 
elevates human communication to a qualitatively new level in comparison to the 
communication of subhuman hominids. For it is only with the possibility to represent 
reality in systems of symbols and linguistic-symbols that an intrinsic obstacle affect-
ing human interaction and the communicative-orientation with the aid of personal and 
factual meanings of objects is generally and systematically cleared: the need for the 
object carrying meaning to be present to the senses. No such obstacle exists in sym-
bolic communication. Its defining trait is that it allows for communication about things 
and humans even if these are absent. This kind of communication is an absolute 
precondition for the development of increasingly-expansive formations of societal 
production that are stable over time. What makes this, especially, a precondition is 
that it is only with the emergence of symbolic communication that the generalising 
and generalised conception of the properties of the external world appropriated dur-
ing the labour process is fully secured, as is the systematic expansion of the human 
experience of reality in thought. Linguistic-symbolic communication, which must also 
(and only) be seen as the result and pre-condition of productive-cooperative sus-
tainment, thus has the function of organising societal labour on the basis of deliber-
ate knowledge. In so doing, it also establishes the degree of sociality in the produc-
tion of human life that is necessary and possible on a specific level of the material 
historical process.  
2.2. The Blindness of Commodity Production 
The material historical process, observed in its (ever changing) societally given form, 
can be described on three levels that constitute it essentially.  
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Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the outset) are the 
first social forms, in which human productive capacity develops only to a slight 
extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on objective 
[sachlicher] dependence is the second great form, in which a system of gen-
eral social metabolism, of universal relations relations, of all-round needs and 
universal capacities is formed for the first time. Free individuality, based on the 
universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their com-
munal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage. (Marx 
1857/58, 158). 
It is the aim of this section to portray and analyse the second level of societal devel-
opment mentioned above – the level of capitalistic commodity production. 
It is the defining feature of the societal form of commodity production – and it is the 
basic and not yet the capitalistic form of commodity production that is being dis-
cussed here – that the exchange of goods acts as the mediator of production and 
consumption. “That something was produced does not suffice, individual consump-
tion relies on exchange, that is to say, only exchange can establish the physiological 
interaction between the human and nature proper” (Haug 1974, 107). In commodity 
production, which is a necessary but not the sufficient pre-condition for the formation 
of a capitalistic society, use-values are neither produced in a deliberately organized 
cooperative division of labour nor are they methodologically distributed following evi-
dent criteria. The commodities produced, rather, are the result of private-labour that 
is independently conducted. It is only through the exchange on the market that these 
commodities become part of a visible societal context. 
 
Objects of utility become commodities only because they are the products of 
the labour of private individuals who work independently of each other. The 
sum total of the labour of all these private individuals forms the aggregate la-
bour of society. Since the producers do not come into social contact until they 
exchange the products of their labour, the specific social characteristics of 
their private labours appear only within this exchange. In other words, the la-
bour of the private individual manifests itself as an element of the total labour 
of society only through the relations which the act of exchange establishes be-
tween the products, and, through their mediation, between the producers. 
(Marx 1867, 165) 
As the societally decisive form of intercourse shaping commodity production, the pro-
cess of exchange demands the general quantitative comparability of the goods that 
are to be traded, a comparability that cannot be achieved with objectified use values, 
because these cannot be equated to one another in an abstract-quantitative manner. 
It is the exchange value, rather, the value of goods on the market, that provides the 
measure by which goods are equated. This value is qualified by the average amount 
of labour it takes to produce a given commodity within a society. As such, it repre-
sents an abstract-quantitative variable that dissolves the distinction between an emp-
ty, concrete activity and its concrete result. Once it finds recourse to this variable, 
exchange assumes a definite form: the value form, a form that is not only a commodi-
ty form, but also a form of praxis, the form in which a society that produces privately 
and on the basis of the division of labour undertakes its societal interaction. 
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[I]n a society that produces a) by means of a societal division of labour and b) 
privately and without a plan, products necessarily assume the commodity 
form. Consequently, the life of every individual belonging to such a society is 
mediated doubly by the following processes: human interaction with nature is 
based on a division of labour (that is to say, they assimilate natural-matter in 
accordance to specific human needs); they then exchange the result of this 
amongst each other (because production may have been based on a division 
of labour, but a division without a plan or societal appropriation and distribu-
tion). This society thus conducts social interaction with the result that every 
member of this society can to some extent command over all the means re-
quired to sustain life, over all provisions, and each member can practice its in-
dividual consumptive interaction with nature. One can thus say that the value-
form […] is not just some pragmatic form, but the basic economic form by 
means of which humans of a given societal formation establish their societal 
cohesion and, by doing so, facilitate their interaction with nature (Haug 1974, 
160-161).  
In fully formed societies based on exchange, this societal exchange of material nei-
ther happens directly nor mediated by a succession of goods that act as a kind of 
quasi-money, exchange is mediated by means of a shared [allgemein] third element: 
money. With money – which is to be understood as a logical historical consequence 
of the developed society based on exchange and the contradiction between use-
value and exchange-value – the exchange function, which enables the quantification 
and comparison of everything and anything thus enabling universal exchange, takes 
on a life of its own. 
 
Money necessarily crystallizes out of the process of exchange, in which differ-
ent products of labour are in fact equated with each other, and thus converted 
into commodities. The historical broadening and deepening of the phenome-
non of exchange develops the opposition between use-value and value which 
is latent in the nature of the commodity. The need to give an external expres-
sion to this opposition for the purposes of commercial intercourse produces 
the drive towards an independent form of value, which finds neither rest nor 
peace until an independent form has been achieved by the differentiation of 
commodities into commodities and money. (Marx 1867, 181) 
It is not money that makes commodities commensurable. Quite the opposite: only 
because commodities are comparable by their very nature – as objectified results of 
human labour, as congealed labour time as such – it is also possible to represent 
them in a unit of value that is common to all. This makes money a necessary expres-
sion of the unit of value that is intrinsic to commodities: labour time. It is only with the 
full establishment of exchange facilitated by money that the societal determination of 
commodity producing labour is posited as a totality of societal labour [gesellschaft-
liche Gesamtarbeit]. “Labour on the basis of exchange values presupposes, precise-
ly, that neither the labour of the individual nor his product are directly general; that 
the product attains this form only by passing through an objective mediation, by 
means of a form of money distinct from itself” (Marx 1857/58, 172). 
In a society that produces privately and on the basis of the division of labour and in 
which commodities are distributed neither in a planned manner nor following the col-
lective will of those who are part of production, but instead following the quasi natural 
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law of the market, the exchange value commodities assume appear to be tangible 
traits and the unit by which they are exchanged appears to be an intrinsic quality of 
the commodities themselves. 
 
If commodities could speak, they would say this: our use-value may interest 
men, but it does not belong to us as objects. What does belong to us as ob-
jects, however, is our value. Our own intercourse as commodities proves it. 
We relate to each other merely as exchange-values. (Marx 1867, 176-177).  
But this illusory concreteness of the exchange value does not actually manifest itself 
in the natural form of commodities [Naturalform der Waren], and it cannot do so, be-
cause exchange value is actually a societal relation that is factually integrated by ma-
terial objects. But the illusory concreteness of the exchange value that seems mani-
fest in objects successfully suggest that it is the exchange value that determines the 
exchange and movement of commodities. As such, this illusory concreteness creates 
the impression that societal processes are detached from the subjects that maintain it 
and it creates the illusion that the societal relations mediating exchange are relations 
between things. This illusory concreteness is addressed by the concept of commodity 
fetishism.  
 
Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the product of labour, as soon 
as it assumes the form of a commodity? Clearly, it arises from this form itself. 
The equality of the kinds of human labour takes on a physical form in the 
equal objectivity of the products of labour as values; the measure of the ex-
penditure of human labour-power by its duration takes on the form of the mag-
nitude of the value of the products of labour; and finally the relationships be-
tween the producers, within which the social characteristics of their labours are 
manifested, take on the form of a social relation between the products of la-
bour. The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore 
simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of 
men's own labour as objective characteristics of the products of labour them-
selves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it also reflects 
the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labour as a social rela-
tion between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the pro-
ducers. […] It is nothing but the definite social relation between men them-
selves which assumes here, f or them, the fantastic form of a relation between 
things. (Marx 1867, 164-165) 
Under such conditions, the production and distribution of products seems to happen 
autonomously and independently of the aims of individuals; societal motion seems to 
assert itself ‘behind the back’ of the producers and takes place as if it were an un-
swayable force that could be equated to natural law. 
It has already been established, that the abstract, objectified [versachlicht] basic 
societal condition of commodity exchange is most apparent in the phenomenon of 
money – money is the purest manifestation of commodity fetishism. The mystery of 
money-fetishism is thus not only the most starkly visible, but also the most blinding 
manifestation of the mystery of commodity fetishism. In money, the real sociality of 
the producers that provides the basis of societal production and distribution process 
appears in the form of a bare abstraction.  
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Money [...] directly and simultaneously becomes the real community [Gemein-
wesen], since it is the general substance of survival for all, and at the same 
time the social product of all. But as we have seen, in money the community 
[Gemeinwesen] is at the same time a mere abstraction, a mere external, acci-
dental thing for the individual, and at the same time merely a means for his 
satisfaction as an isolated individual. (Marx 1857/58, 225-226). 
Commodity production, as noted above, is a necessary but not sufficient trait of capi-
talist mode of production.  
 
Capitalist production is not merely the production of commodities, it is, by its 
very essence, the production of surplus-value. The worker produces not for 
himself, but for capital. It is no longer sufficient, therefore, for him simply to 
produce. He must produce surplus-value. (Marx 1867, 664). 
Money here no longer merely features as the universal medium of exchange, but as 
‘capital’ that seems to be the source of societal motion by becoming a ‘value that val-
orises itself’ [sich selbst verwertender Wert].  
 
The relation between the value preposited to production and the value which 
results from it […] constitutes the all-embracing and decisive factor in the 
whole process of capitalist production. […] [I]n capital the independent exist-
ence of value is raised to a higher power than in money. (Marx 1861-3, 318). 
Because value takes on a life of its own, and because the surplus value created by 
the wage labourer, who is its direct producer and the actual productive force, is swal-
lowed up by this process, the productive force of labour in society now appears as if 
it were intrinsic to capital. Because in capitalistic society the productive force of so-
ciety is based on the buying and selling of labour power as a commodity, the worker 
is here tied into the factual relations of commodities. 
 
[T]he sale and purchase of labour-power […] displays to us the capitalist and 
the worker only as the buyer and seller of commodities. What distinguishes the 
worker from the vendors of other commodities is only the specific nature, the 
specific use-value, of the commodity he sells. But the particular use-value of a 
commodity does not affect the economic form of the transaction; it does not al-
ter the fact that the purchaser represents money, and the vendor a commodity. 
(Marx 1863-5, 1002). 
The commodity labour power may thus occupy a special position in terms of its use-
value – it is the only commodity that produces value; but in terms of its exchange-
value, labour power is basically commensurate with all other commodities and can be 
abstractly quantified by money. Wage labourers must offer themselves as commodi-
ties on the labour market. The capitalist is interested in the use-value of labour pow-
er, in its ability to generate value and surplus value, whereas the wage labourers sell-
ing their labour power can only demand the exchange-value of this commodity: they 
are refunded the costs the (re-)production of their labour power incurs. By selling 
their labour power to the capitalist, wage labourers necessarily admit that, from a 
theoretical perspective focused on prices, the price their labour power can achieve as 
commodity is aligned to the costs of the (re)production of their labour power; it is not 
aligned to the value of the commodity their labour helps produce. Thus, to ensure 
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that capital actually creates value, the value of this commodity must always be great-
er than the value of the price paid for the labour power that produces it. In the course 
of this exchange, labourers must cede such a degree of autonomy toward their own 
labour that one can say that “capitalists use labourers toward their own ends” 
(Holzkamp 1973, 208). Alongside the development of capitalism from manufacture to 
industrial production and the separation of physical and intellectual labour, which be-
comes a concrete material reality and trait of capital in machinery and the organisa-
tion of the factory, this subsumption of the worker by the process of turning capital 
into value becomes all-encompassing.  
 
Every kind of capitalist production, in so far as it is not only a labour process 
but also capital's process of valorization, has this in common, but it is not the 
worker who employs the conditions of his work, but rather the reverse, the 
conditions of work employ the worker. However, it is only with the coming of 
machinery that this inversion first acquires a technical and palpable reality. 
Owing to its conversion into an automaton, the instrument of labour confronts 
the worker during the labour process in the shape of capital, dead labour, 
which dominates and soaks up living labour-power. The separation of the intel-
lectual faculties of the production process from manual labour, and the trans-
formation of those faculties into powers exercised by capital over labour, is, as 
we have already shown, finally completed by large-scale industry erected on 
the foundation of machinery. The special skill of each individual machine-
operator, who has now been deprived of all significance, vanishes as an infini-
tesimal quantity in the face of the science, the gigantic natural forces, and the 
mass of social labour embodied in the system of machinery (Marx 1867, 548-
549). 
The full extent to which labourers are subordinate to capital by selling their labour 
power can only be recognized if cooperation is taken into account. The extent to 
which major capitalist industry establishes itself, and the multifaceted interdependen-
cies generated by machines as means of labour this generates, determines how co-
operation, as the most basic trait of any societal organisation of life, shapes society 
as a whole. With the emergence of a machine-mediated structure of cooperation, and 
the rapid growth of productive power that is bound to this, capital attains a particular 
power to control labour: if the command of capital over labour initially presents itself 
as a formal subsumption of the wage labourer – wage labourers do not work for 
themselves but for the capitalist and thus under the capitalist’s command – then the 
cooperation of many wage labourers turns this formal subsumption by the command 
of capital into the absolute condition of the production process. And this results in the 
real subsumption of labour by capital. “That a capitalist should command in the field 
of production is now as indispensable as that a general should command on the field 
of battle” (Marx 1967, 448). 
What matters here is that cooperation, in the form it attains in capitalism, is not the 
product of a consciously planned, collective activity of those who directly cooperate – 
in fact, the wage labourers are necessarily excluded from any theoretical and practi-
cal agency in this cooperation. For cooperation, in the form it attains in capitalism, is 
a mere effect of capital and is simultaneously also means that one is applied by capi-
tal; the division of labour that connects wage labourers is imposed from the outside, it 
is mediated by capital. Wage labourers may be part of direct cooperative relation-
tripleC 16(1): 357-405, 2018 377 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2018. 
ships on diverse levels – from detailed activities and sub-operations all the way up to 
comprehensive structures of cooperation. 
 
But, because of the wage labourers’ exclusion from the actual planning of the 
productive process, a ‘third’ element and ‘common cause’ that could mediate 
the free cooperation of those who actually produce is missing; a common 
cause, by means of which every individual contribution attains a tangible 
meaning with a social dimension. Thus, workers are not only personally de-
tached and in the dark about the societal role they perform, but they are also 
isolated from every other worker (Holzkamp 1973, 210).  
Because capitalistic conditions necessarily lead to the exclusion of wage labourers 
from the conscious and collaborative planning of their cooperative activities, the con-
tribution these labourers factually make to the sustainment and flourishing of society 
cannot be the conscious aim that motivates their labour. This only leaves the wage 
as the subjective aim that the individual can attribute to their and the individual con-
sumption this enables.  
 
[T]he product of his activity is not the object of his activity. What he produces 
for himself is not the silk that he weaves, not the gold that he draws from the 
mine, not the palace that he builds. What he produces for himself is wages, 
and silk, gold, palace resolve themselves for him into a definite quantity of the 
means of subsistence […] The twelve hours' labour, on the other hand, has no 
meaning for him as weaving, spinning, drilling, etc., but as earnings, which 
bring him to the table, to the public house, into bed. (Marx and Engels 1849, 
202-203) 
This reiterates again that in societal labour in the form it takes under capitalistic con-
ditions, the specifically ‘human’ unity of collaborative societal production as an activi-
ty guided by knowledge and individual consumption can only be realised in a dis-
jointed and contradictory manner. It is realised as a process in which those who sup-
port and maintain the connection [between production and consumption] necessarily 
remain blind toward this, until the wage and commodity fetish that regulates this con-
nection is broken in thought and action. The nascent state of such knowledge and 
action is the realisation that under conditions created by capitalist modes of produc-
tion societal cohesion is only ever retroactively established, established behind the 
back of those who are immediately involved in producing it and who experience pro-
duction as a blind, mechanical necessity, as an alien, tangible power, but that despite 
this, this cohesion is nevertheless the solely achieved because of their own activities 
(Haug 1974, 164). 
To sum up:  
 
The very necessity of first transforming individual products or activities into ex-
change value, into money, so that they obtain and demonstrate their social 
power in this objective [sachlichen] form, proves two things: 1. That individuals 
now produce only for society and in society; 2. that production is not directly 
social, is not 'the offspring of association', which distributes labour internally. 
Individuals are subsumed under social production; social production exists 
outside them as their fate; but social production is not subsumed under indi-
viduals, manageable by them as their common wealth. (Marx 1857/58, 158) 
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Under the conditions of capitalistic modes of production (and the antagonism be-
tween wage labour and capital this entails), this circumstance, which applies to 
commodity production in general, takes on a specific form that reveals itself in an ex-
emplary manner in the situation wage labourers find themselves in: 
 
In the professional realm, the part of life in which wage labourer makes an ob-
jectively useful and valuable contribution to society with his or her work, the 
wage labourer does not belong to him or herself, but is subject to the com-
mand of the capitalist. As a consequence, what the wage labourer produces 
cannot be the personal aim of his or her activity. Outside of work, the part of 
life in which the wage labourer seemingly belongs to him or herself, the wage 
labourer cannot perform socially meaningful activities. He or she can… only 
commandeer their own individual consumption. The actual ‘human’ unity be-
tween collaborative societal production and individual consumption has thus 
been severed by force…In the time the wage labourer spends as a ‘profes-
sional’, he or she cannot be ‘a private individual’, because the wage labourer 
does not belong to him or herself. In the time the wage labourer is a private in-
dividual, when the back is turned on professional matters that have no per-
sonal meaning, life’s possibilities can necessarily only be sought to be realised 
outside of the productive activity – and, as a matter of course, the demands 
toward life can never be satisfied in the societal lack of perspective a ‘private’ 
existence affords (Holzkamp 1973, 249). 
The profound consequences of capitalistic sociality are at first not only hidden from 
the wage labourer’s consciousness (until this condition can be recognized and 
changed on the basis of scientific knowledge), the fetish-character of commodity and 
wage that the capitalist mode of production establishes also tends to counteract any 
attempt to examine the laws governing this mode of production. Through the fetish-
character of commodity and wage, things assume a personal and tangible meaning 
and this context makes it exceptionally difficult to theoretically and pragmatically see 
through the societal system to reach its nerve: the production of surplus value. This is 
especially difficult for those who are immediately involved in producing this surplus 
value (in a certain sense this includes everyone), for those who are themselves 
commodities as workers and are thus immediately exposed to the consequences of 
the existence of commodities and commodity fetishism.  
The manifestation of this fetish-character of wage and commodities in the tangible 
and personal meaning of objects, that shape the knowledge and action of the imme-
diate producers can be specifically described by means of a few requirements that 
act as a basic qualification for participation in capitalist sociality. The qualifications 
consist of 1. a specific consciousness for price and value; 2. a specific ideology of 
ownership and property; 3. a specific attitude toward achievement, competition and 
merit; 4. sympathy as a specific criterion that regulates interpersonal relationships; 5. 
a specific interpretation of the connection (or rather assumed opposition) between 
privacy and sociality. 
 
1. Under the conditions a capitalistic mode of production creates, the consciousness 
of the immediate producers sees in the factual meaning of things commodities 
and traits of commodities. Because the societal nature of value and price cannot 
be perceived, they are taken to be immediate natural properties that objects are 
invested with, properties which belong to the material properties of these objects, 
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and which even appear to have a special significance in relation to the objects 
other natural properties. The pure form of the reification of the value of commodi-
ties, a process through which value appears to be a trait of commodities that has 
a tangible quality, manifests itself in money. The money form is the abstract em-
bodiment of an undefined number of completely incompatible possibilities of ex-
changing objects of utility. This has the following consequence: because it almost 
exclusively operates on the basis of knowledge and insight that is established and 
oriented by the senses and because it remains transfixed by a narrow awareness 
of facts and ‘details’, average everyday consciousness [Alltagsbewusstsein] does 
not apprehend the intrinsic discrepancy between the use value and the exchange 
value of commodities and the societal relation that this discrepancy establishes 
and reflects. Unscientific everyday consciousness that is not illuminated by 
knowledge can only apprehends this societal relation as a relation of things. 
2. The form of consciousness that emerges from the fetish-character of commodity 
and money inevitably sees the value things ‘have’ and command (as measured in 
money and thus by an external attribute) as a quasi-natural property and as a 
personal meaning that belongs to subjects in realty. This property appears as the 
decisive variable that colours personal perception and is also the regulator of in-
terpersonal relationships and social hierarchy. Money again exemplifies this es-
pecially well:  
 
That which is for me through the medium of money – that for which I can pay 
(i.e., which money can buy) – that am I myself, the possessor of the money. 
The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. Money’s proper-
ties are my – the possessor’s – properties and essential powers. Thus, what I 
am and am capable of is by no means determined by my individuality. […] I, 
according to my individual characteristics, am lame, but money furnishes me 
with twenty-four feet. […] Do not I, who thanks to money am capable of all that 
the human heart longs for, possess all human capacities? […] If money is the 
bond binding me to human life, binding society to me, connecting me with na-
ture and man, is not money the bond of all bonds? Can it not dissolve and bind 
all ties? Is it not, therefore, also the universal agent of separation? It is the coin 
that really separates as well as the real binding agent – the […] chemical pow-
er of society. (Marx 1844, 324).  
3. Because, viewed from the dominant position arising from the valorisation of capi-
tal [kapitalverwertend], the individual labour that is expended is not measured by 
its ability to create use-value, but by its ability translate abstract-human labour into 
concrete value and surplus value; this ability to create value must have a special 
significance amidst the basic qualities that are required to participate in capitalistic 
society that were mentioned above. This finds expression, on the one hand, in the 
fact that capitalistic labour processes and qualifications are formally geared to-
wards performance, notwithstanding the concrete use of what is to be performed, 
and, on the other hand, in competitive behaviour that is bent on ‘getting ahead’ in 
an individualistic-utilitarian manner, in a mechanism, therefore, that is essentially 
maintained by the belief that performance (expenditure of labour) and remunera-
tion (wage) are in a balance. The implications of the category ‘wage’ explain why 
this belief can prevail, a belief which maintains the ideology of ‘freedom’ and 
‘equality’ in capitalism: as outlined earlier, the capitalist compensates the worker 
for the value of their labour-power by refunding the costs incurred by the acquisi-
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tion of the ‘means necessary to sustain a living’ – (and the hours of the day the 
worker needs to expend for this are the required working hours). However, by 
paying a wage, the capitalist buys the right to use the labour of the worker longer 
than the time it takes for this labour to reproduce its own value. The capitalist 
buys the right to demand the surplus labour that is the foundation of surplus val-
ue. The capitalist pays for the labour-power, but not for the ‘labour’ itself. This, as 
outlined above, has far-reaching consequences: 
 
On the surface of bourgeois society the worker's wage appears as the price of 
labour, as a certain quantity of money that is paid for a certain quantity of la-
bour. Thus people speak of the value of labour, and call its expression in 
money its necessary or natural price. (Marx 1867, 675) 
The wage-form thus extinguishes every trace of the division of the working day 
into necessary labour and surplus labour, into paid labour and unpaid labour. 
All labour appears as paid labour. […] We must therefore understand the deci-
sive importance of the transformation of value and price of labour-power into 
the form of wages, or into the value and price of labour itself. All the notions of 
justice held by both the worker and the capitalist, all the mystifications of the 
capitalist mode of production, all capitalism’s illusions about freedom, all the 
apologetic tricks of vulgar economics, have as their basis the form of appear-
ance discussed above, which makes the actual relation invisible, and indeed 
presents to the eye the precise opposite of that relation. (Marx 1867, 680) 
4. Because the worker selling ‘labour power’ as a commodity is, by definition, cut off 
from the societal planning and conscious control of production and distribution, 
the domain of work cannot be experienced as meaningful in itself, but merely as 
the sphere in which the financial prerequisites for individual consumption are ob-
tained, for consumption that happens privately and not as part of one’s profes-
sional life. In this way, the private realm attains the suggestive power of being a 
sphere that lies beyond the criteria of ‘performance’ and ‘remuneration’, a sphere 
in which that which is ‘truly human’ takes shape and can be shared together with 
others on the basis of purely personal likes and dislikes. This real illusion leads, 
as a direct consequence, to the ideology of the indissoluble opposition between 
the heteronomy of subjects in the industrial world of work, which is primarily a 
consequence of technology, and the autonomy of private life that enables self-
determination and free association of subjects. 
 
Whereas the individual worker, forced to bring the ‘performance’ from which 
‘remuneration’ seems to stem, stands in an isolating relationship of competi-
tion to other workers, who are a potential threat to the individual’s employment 
and subsistence, the modes of communication and interaction that prevail in 
private life are focused on togetherness…In private life, the primacy of the 
competitive element does not apply, but the connection people share on ac-
count of a socially useful task…is also missing. Private togetherness may 
have a tendency to combat isolation and thus includes certain elements of so-
cietal cooperation, but it cannot actualise this cooperation because of the 
wedge between the non-professional realm and societal production (Holzkamp 
1973, 250). 
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5. The account of privacy that has been provided – and the fixation of private life on 
putatively purely personal, ‘purely human’ qualities – has the (necessarily futile) 
aspiration of finding satisfaction with one’s own existence through the seemingly 
unmediated interrelation of isolated subjects. Because they seem and must seem 
to be distinct from the material, professional activities of these subjects, these 
‘purely human’ relationships can only be regulated by one empty criterion: sympa-
thy. The criterion sympathy here represents a binding agent between subjects 
that view themselves as private-individuals. It is a criterion that merely relates to 
factually arbitrary, external, personal characteristics that change with fashion and 
as such, it can only give rise to circular, self-referential relationships bereft of per-
spective.  
 
Under the conditions of the capitalistic mode of production, humans who work are 
only left with “two alternative life-situations: 1. meaningless societal production that is 
controlled by others under the command of capital and 2. separation from a socially 
useful activity, reduction of human life to individual consumption as part of a circular 
‘private’ existence without wider perspective” (Holzkamp 1973, 261). If this is indeed 
the conclusions to be drawn from these brief reflections, then one must empathically 
state that this only describes one side of the context formed by the personal meaning 
and the meaning of objects that shape communication and interaction on the basis of 
an at best sporadically enlightened everyday consciousness. But even on this level of 
thought and practice the second side enters again and again – the dimension of per-
sonal meaning and the meaning of objects that is related to the work-process and 
relevant to cooperation, the dimension that is in equal measures the point of depar-
ture for scientific knowledge about societal development and the emergence of a 
consciously organised, collaboratively planned societal praxis. It is nevertheless the 
case that under capitalistic conditions the fetish-character of commodity and money 
is the decisive determinant of the average consciousness outlined above, precisely 
as the societally speaking average and ordinary form of consciousness. It is the con-
sciousness of “abstract personhood” (Sève 1973, 360), in which the relationship be-
tween the general-human medium of societalisation and the medium of commodity-
exchange has been inverted (in terms of the relationship of communication and soci-
ality): “The exchange of private property (which includes the commodity ‘labour-
power’ – H.H.) is seen to be the ‘natural’ form of societal communication” (Kästle 
1972, 133). 
One of the consequences of this, is that the commodity itself attains a communica-
tive character: 
 
the commodity has linguistic-traits in a multiple sense: a) it expresses an 
equation with other products and work and thus acts as a synonym and practi-
cally establishes equivalence; b) it has a hieroglyphic, fetishlike dimension that 
makes commodities appear as autonomously acting things (this paradoxical 
reality finds expression in linguistic paradoxes); c) it has an onomasiological 
dimension (the price acts as the name of the commodity) (Erckenbrecht 1973, 
149).  
This inversion of the relation between communication in the form of commodity ex-
change and societal communication as such has a second consequence: Both the 
communicative-orientation by means of personal meaning and the meanings of 
things and the linguistic-symbolic communication that unfolds attain a commodity 
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character themselves, one that is scarcely recognised and which emerges because 
of special commodities – the capitalistic media. A third consequence that results from 
communication that is shaped by capitalism is that the communicative character of 
commodities and the commodity character of communication act as the basis for an 
illusory synthesis of society as a whole. This synthesis is illusory because it does not 
result from a consciously and collectively organised interaction with nature, but is 
merely an expression of a mode of production, in which the societalisation of working 
subjects only ever happens retroactively [nachträglich], only after work has been 
done, so to speak. And in line with this, it is experienced as a quasi-natural, fateful 
destiny, and not as an artificial [gemachter] and thus changeable social reality [Sozi-
alzusammenhang]. 
2.3 The Principle of Capitalistic Societalisation 
Capitalistic commodity production, and the societal conditions emerging from this, 
primarily and necessarily establishes itself by means of a mode of production that 
relies on private labour as part of a division of labour, and in which the private char-
acter is only visibly part of a societal context by means of commodity exchange. This 
form of societalisation is determined by private work that is undertaken independent-
ly; the societal context that necessarily prevails without the conscious control of those 
who produce it 
 
is expressed in exchange value, by means of which alone each individual's 
own activity or his product becomes an activity and a product for him […] The 
social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the 
share of individuals in production here appear as something alien and objec-
tive, confronting the individuals, not as their relation to one another, but as 
their subordination to relations which subsist independently of them and which 
arise out of collisions between mutually indifferent individuals. […] [T]heir mu-
tual interconnection […] here appears as something alien to them, autono-
mous, as a thing. (Marx 1857/58, 157) 
Because individuals are [on the one hand] 
 
not subsumed under any naturally evolved community and, on the other, are 
not consciously communal individuals subsuming the community under them-
selves, this community must also exist as an independent, external, casual 
thing [ein … Sachliches] with respect to them as independent subjects. That is 
precisely the condition for their simultaneously being in some social connec-
tion as independent private persons. (Marx 1858, 468) 
This has two consequences: to the producers, the connection [Zusammenhang] be-
tween their private work [Privatarbeiten] must appear to be a thing (money), and the 
common element of society must take on a specific shape. In this manner, exchange 
value in the form of money mediates the societal unity of production; at the same 
time, the conditions required for commodity production, which lie beyond the narrow 
horizon of the privately working subjects, are tried to be maintained by an authority 
that is extrinsic to the individual interests of producers. “This fixation of social activity, 
this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into a material power above us, 
growing out of our, control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calcu-
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lations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.” (Marx and 
Engels 1846, 47-48) 
In fully established capitalistic commodity production, a further condition to the 
production of exchange takes shape, namely, the antagonism of wage labour and 
capital, exploitation and the production of surplus value. This means that the ex-
change of commodities (and this includes the commodity ‘labour’), the exchange of 
equal values, of equivalents, mediates the production and appropriation of surplus 
value only on the surface of society. 
 
The exchange of equivalents, the original operation with which we started, is 
now turned round in such a way that there is only an apparent exchange, 
since, firstly, the capital which is exchanged for labour-power is itself merely a 
portion of the product of the labour of others which has been appropriated 
without an equivalent; and, secondly, this capital must not only be replaced by 
its producer, the worker, but replaced together with an added surplus. The re-
lation of exchange between capitalist and labourer becomes a mere sem-
blance belonging only to the process of circulation, it becomes a mere form, 
which is alien to the content of the transaction itself, and merely mystifies it. 
The constant sale and purchase of labour-power is the form; the content is the 
constant appropriation by the capitalist, without equivalent, of a portion of the 
labour of others which has already been objectified, and his repeated ex-
change of this labour for a greater quantity of the living labour of others. (Marx 
1867, 729-730).  
On this basis of this illusory, and necessarily illusory exchange of equivalence, capi-
talistic societal formation perpetually confirms and renews itself, for it is propelled by 
the effect of the law of value, which decrees that only equivalents, only equal com-
modity values can be exchanged. The laws governing commodity production and 
exchange create societal cohesion; regulated by the law of value, the production pro-
cess that valorises capital continuously renews its own societal preconditions behind 
the back of the producers. 
 
It is not just the objective conditions of the process of production that appear 
as its result. The same thing is true also of its specific social character. The 
social relations and therefore the social position of the agents of production in 
relation to each other, i.e. the relations of production, are themselves pro-
duced: they are also the constantly renewed result of the process. (Marx 1863-
5, 1065). 
This process seems to create so little friction that an external intervention scarcely 
seems necessary. But how is this reconciled with the necessary doubling of the capi-
talistic societal formation into society and state that was mentioned above? And how 
is this reconciled with the necessary formal atomisation of the state as a control- and 
administrative-apparatus that is divorced from the societal context?  
The following circumstance provides that answer to these questions: in capitalism, 
the preservation of societal cohesion is no longer bound to the repressive force of 
religious and other ideologies and is also no longer bound to immediate personal re-
lationships of dependency and subjection. Once the societal process as a whole is 
mediated by the circulation of commodities, and by the freedom of the wage labour-
ers to sell their own labour and by the freedom of capitalists to appropriate surplus 
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value, this has the following inevitable consequence: forms of direct force and struc-
tures of personal dependence are purged from the economic process. Instead, the 
‘monopoly over physical violence’ is yielded to another societal authority, one that is 
distinct from this economic process. The principal purpose of this authority – i.e., the 
state – is to guarantee, as formal civil rights, the intrinsic recognition of the principles 
that are necessary to mediate the intercourse of commodity-owners. These principles 
are ‘equality’ (all subjects exchange and as such they are related to one another in 
the same way) and ‘freedom’ (all subjects see themselves as property-owners who 
relinquish their property only out of their free will). As general conditions of the capi-
talistic societal process, the guarantee of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ thus means two 
things: 
 
1. The creation of the material preconditions of production (the general ‘infra-
structure’), which is not produced by the movement of private capital that is 
motivated by narrow-minded interest in profit. 2. Intervention in the process of 
the reproduction of capital when this is ‘impaired’. Intervention can take the 
form of action against individual capitalists or against workers (guarantee of 
the civil rule of law) or it can be prompted by intrinsic contradictions in the tra-
jectory of reproduction itself (economic regulation, subsidies, and so forth) 
(Hirsch 1974, CXLV-CXLVI). 
In other words: the state, as a societal reality, is the sphere in which the formal and 
political cohesion of capitalistic society is instituted, a cohesion established materially 
– by means of conscious planning, organisation and control of the development of 
productive forces – and which cannot be achieved if societalisation happens under 
the unconscious-anarchic dictate of capital. 
 
The ‘common interest’ the institutionalisation of the state represents, consists 
in the guarantee of this formal cohesion…The key feature of this ‘common in-
terest’ is that it develops on the foundation of a system of private interests that 
are relieved of any social allegiances. This formal generality [Allgemeinheit] 
and obligation is the necessary manifestation of the private nature of social 
aims and the non-obligation toward these aims that shape these interests. So-
cietal needs must take the shape of an established interest in order to become 
the object of formal generality; they must thus be non-binding in societal 
terms, in order to become politically and legally binding. They must thus have 
the attribute of being ‘moveable’ across societal modes of interaction and it is 
by means of this that formal societal cohesion is created (Preuß 1975, 106). 
Because the relationship of the capitalistic economy to the capitalistic state can evi-
dently only be discussed by taking the relationship of the state to the societally pre-
dominant forms of societal intercourse (and this means: communication and interac-
tion) into account, this problem will be discussed in more detail now.  
Forms of societal intercourse here denote the specific interpersonal relationships 
and institutional arrangements in which the members of society are exposed to the 
dominant principle of societalisation. Capitalism’s principle of societalisation consists 
in the subsumption of living labour by capital’s imperative to extract value. Subjects, 
however, do not seek direct recourse to this principle, but via specific, indirect (and 
thus especially also ‘communicative’) actions, performances and contexts of actions 
– thus, via forms of societal intercourse. Capitalistic forms of societal intercourse are 
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rooted in the detachment of the immediate producers from the societal life-context. 
This is detached in the sense that it is only through private actions and interests that 
the immediate producers can consciously integrate themselves into this societal con-
text: 
 
integration into the system of societal labour takes place in the interest of be-
ing payed; integration into the sphere of consumption takes place in the inter-
est of relaxation and in compensation for the sociality they are deprived of in 
the sphere of production; integration into the sphere of commodity interaction 
takes place with the aim of … satisfying their own (isolated, particular – H.H.) 
interests (Preuß 1975, 54). 
The forms of exchange in which subjects pursue their private interests non-violently 
and in mutual recognition, and by means of which they are meant to create societal 
cohesion, are the societally predominant forms of societal intercourse. These forms 
of exchange assume the freedom and equality of subjects, for they assume that indi-
viduals do not engage in this form of societal intercourse by exchanging their own 
individual properties and concrete necessities of life, but as subjects who exchange 
equivalents, that is equivalent commodities (which also includes the commodity ‘la-
bour’). 
 
Indeed, in so far as the commodity or labour is conceived of only as exchange 
value, and the relation in which the various commodities are brought into con-
nection with one another is conceived as the exchange of these exchange 
values with one another, as their equation, then the individuals, the subjects 
between whom this process goes on, are simply and only conceived of as ex-
changers. As far as the formal character is concerned, there is absolutely no 
distinction between them, and this is the economic character, the aspect in 
which they stand towards one another in the exchange relation (Marx 1857/58, 
241). 
However, these forms of societal intercourse in the shape of exchange in a sense 
only represent the necessary condition for the functioning of capitalistic societalisa-
tion. The sufficient condition is established when formal and usually compulsory limi-
tations are imposed on actions shaped by private interests. The way in which sub-
jects are included in the establishment of regulative rules (and in the implementation 
of ways of enforcing these rules) ties subjects into a ruling administrative organisa-
tion [Herrschaftsorganisation] that is particular to capitalistic societalisation. These 
possibilities to be involved are the civic liberties and rights of participation that are 
underpinned by the principle of legality that is extended to the actions of the state.  
Capitalistic forms of societal intercourse have a universal character; nobody is ex-
cluded from participating in them. The sole criterion for participation is that partici-
pants are legal subjects. This is one side of the legal basis these forms of societal 
intercourse. The other side can be found in the assumption that subjects have com-
mand over societal conditions by means of these forms of societal intercourse. “In 
the forms of societal intercourse in which everybody can freely and equally dispose 
of themselves and their assets, the subject has power over the condition of their own 
life and becomes the ruler of the societal process together with the other subjects” 
(Preuß 1975, 56). So much for the ideology. But in practice, these forms of societal 
intercourse (which are based on freedom and equality and the liberation of subjects 
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by means of exchange) give rise to the decoupling of the structure of production and 
the structure of needs. As they emerge, the productive forces of society are decou-
pled from the best possible way of satisfying the needs of all members of society and 
go their separate ways. 
 
It is only the decoupling of production and the satisfaction of needs that results 
from commodity production that enables a relatively autonomous emergence 
of structures of production on the one side and structures of needs on the oth-
er. The development of the structure of production, which happens in the in-
terest of extracting value from capital, here potentially clashes with the emer-
gence of structures of need in an economic (turnover) and societal sense (cer-
tain needs are only insufficiently satisfied) (Neuendorff 1973, 111-112).  
These forms of societal intercourse here provide the contexts that bring together the 
imperatives of the capitalistic process of production and the needs, especially the 
needs of the immediate produces – but this does not happen because these forms of 
societal intercourse bring production and needs into a reciprocal constitutive-context 
[Konstiutionszusammenhang]. Rather, these forms of societal intercourse forces  
 
individuals to repress the perspective of a societal cohesion constituted by 
their needs in order to turn them into free individuals who are facilitators of a 
process of living, which they cannot control or comprehend. The contradiction 
between an assumed stake in society and the individuals’ actual instrumentali-
sation of self (through the non-conscious subjection to the capitalistic principle 
of societalisation – H.H.) characterises the twofold nature of these forms of 
societal intercourse. Its universalising character is inextricably bound to its la-
tent repressive function (Preuß 1975, 57). 
The guarantee of the forms of societal intercourse the state extends entails both 
these elements. It serves to facilitate the casual articulation of private interests and 
serves as a cage that enforces the self-instrumentalisation of subjects. Both functions 
of state action here result from the demand that relationships of exchange and those 
who exchange are established and protected as legal relationships and legal sub-
jects. But because this legal relationship can only be the formal-legal frame for the 
satisfaction of societal and individual needs by means of commodity production and 
consumption, and because this mode of production can only function by means of an 
abstraction of concrete aims and needs of legal subjects, the guarantee with which 
the state underwrites the forms of societal intercourse implies: 
 
an enforced guarantee of a sphere of abstract universality, because it alone 
guarantees that societal labour is a system of private labour and does not be-
come emancipated as conscious societal labour …The historical particularity 
of this system of political rule is that it is precisely this abstract ‘common inter-
est’ that enacts bourgeois class rule (Preuß 1975, 65). 
For state action does not directly relate to class rule, the antagonism of wage labour 
and capital that capitalistic modes of production posits, this class rule is rather facili-
tated by the guarantee (and thus also identification with) these forms of societal in-
tercourse. But also this indirect relation of state action to the capitalistic principle of 
societalisation (the subsumption of living labour by capital) has the consequence that 
the following must also be included in the formal-legal guarantee of capitalistic forms 
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of societal intercourse: the state needs to respond to severe shortcomings in these 
forms of societal intercourse, and this response is not only ever abstract, but rather 
often amounts to concrete-ideological and predominantly material action. 
Even though capitalistic commodity production is governed by the anarchy of pri-
vate interests, it nevertheless develops “universally binding patterns” (Negt and 
Kluge 1993, 4) in the shape the forms of societal intercourse take. It must be empha-
sised again that this general-obligation [Allgemeinverbindlichkeit] does not result from 
everyone pursuing private interests and actualising common interest thereby, but 
from the fact that private interests always already have a societal character. “The real 
point is not that each individual's pursuit of his private interest promotes the totality of 
private interests, the general interest. [...] The point is rather that private interest is 
itself already a socially determined interest, which can be achieved only within the 
conditions laid down by society and with the means provided by society; hence it is 
bound to the reproduction of these conditions and means. It is the interest of private 
persons; but its content, as well as the form and means of its realization, is given by 
societal conditions independent of all.” (Marx 1857/58, 156) 
 And it is because of this that the patterns of general obligation, societal inter-
course and the articulation and organisation of societal experience and experience 
with society are interpreted as and mistaken to be “products of the collective will, as if 
the actual relationships, which have only been acquired retroactively, were based 
upon this will” (Negt and Kluge 1993, 4). 
The restriction of societal intercourse between subjects (especially the aspects of 
communication and societalisation this entails) that results from the need to retroac-
tively adapt to societal circumstances, which subjects cannot experience and develop 
as a planned and consciously created togetherness, has two implications. It reveals 
1. that the unification of a capitalistic society objectively does not require a broader 
societal communication. “Competition and the law determining value create a cen-
tripetal tendency that holds the societal totality together, even if it isolates individuals” 
(Ibid., 133). 2. Through the permanent contradiction between the sociality of subjects 
(even if this is only ever retroactively established) and the limitedness of their private 
existence, it produces a fundamental need [Bedürfnis] for a substantial, societal, ‘in-
teractive’, ‘communicative’ connection. As was already implied above, such desire 
especially emerges amongst the immediate producers. These find themselves in ex-
treme isolation, not only a factual isolation because of their detachment from the 
possibility to consciously and collectively plan and establish the societal process of 
life, but also an isolation that results from the specific temporal structures capitalistic 
production and organisation entail. 
 
Advanced capitalist commodity production knows only one concept of time: 
this determines the abstractly quantifying measure for the production of value 
and surplus value as an aggregate of units of time. Socially necessary time, 
which the manufacture of a product requires; overtime, which is done within a 
specific period; leisure time as the residual part of the day, which, however, is 
marked by behavior carried over from the domain of production – all of these 
concepts of time have equal status. This concept is derived from the working 
day familiar to every worker, […] This time, which tears apart and fragments 
the real context of living, is experienced as ‘life,’ as second nature. This is 
probably the only level on which a worker can directly experience the inver-
sions linked with commodity fetishism: the experience of his life as a mere 
succession of units of time capable of being valorized by capital, along with a 
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residue that cannot be valorized, or only with difficulty (Negt and Kluge 1993, 
18-19). 
These situational and equally temporal aspects of experience that sink into the con-
sciousness of the immediate producers – to whatever extent – generate the need for 
societal synthesis; a need that cannot be substantially satisfied under the conditions 
of capitalistic modes of production and existence. But to prevent that the forms of 
societal intercourse this mode of production and existence burst apart, an illusory 
synthesis [scheinhafte Synthese] of society must be offered in response to this need. 
A response which effectively builds on the repercussions of the familial societalisa-
tion and alienated labour that are typical of capitalism has to “manufacture the ap-
pearance of a collective will, of a meaningful context that embraces the entire world, 
along with the illusion of participation on the part of all members of society. It is one 
of the foundations of societal discipline. Without it, neither the established order nor 
the protective block of inhibiting procedures could be sustained” (Negt and Kluge 
1993, 56). 
How and why the creation of an illusory synthesis of this kind is also and must es-
pecially be undertaken as part of the ‘communicative’ actions of the state will be dis-
cussed in what follows.  
The discussion that follows, which will focus on a special stage in the emergence 
of capitalism, the current stage, and will focus on a special manifestation of societal 
communication must have the following two starting points. 1. It must build on the 
fact that the relationship of economy and state that constitutes capitalistic modes of 
production results from the necessity of a state guarantee for forms of societal inter-
action (and this means formal and legal, ideological and material measures to protect 
these forms of societal interaction). 2. It must build on the fact that these forms of 
societal intercourse that are guaranteed by the state must arrest the immediate pro-
ducers (‘labour’ as commodity) in its detachment from the possibility of a deliberate 
and cooperatively planned and organised development of society and it must allow 
for an illusory satisfaction of the desire for overarching societal synthesis [gesamtge-
sellschaftliche Synthese]. 
In relation to the overarching problematic one must therefore establish how the re-
lation of capitalistic economy and the capitalistic state finds expression in a specific 
stage of the historical emergence of capitalistic modes of production and a specific 
form of societal communication. One must also establish how this form of communi-
cation relates to the ones that actually ‘create’ the material process of living, and do 
so in capitalism also, even though capitalism for the most part forces these forms of 
communication to take place ‘unconsciously’. 
 
3. Are there Alternatives to Capitalist Communications? 
The analysis of communication provided so far has a major shortcoming, especially 
with regards to the ambition of being an experiential study [erfahrungswissenschaft-
lich]. This shortcoming results from the fact that the form and function of television 
and the connection of this to the conditions in which communication takes place and 
the demands viewers place on communication could not be developed in a sufficient-
ly differentiated manner, neither with regards of the television programme nor the 
audience. At present, the research analysing the content of television and the audi-
ence that is required to develop a differentiated treatment does not exist. As such, 
the analysis advanced here must be understood as a (hopefully) theoretically 
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grounded, empirically oriented approximation to the actual societal problematic. This, 
in turn, has some consequences for the reflections on the politics and practices of 
communication that are discussed in this section. These are only partially substanti-
ated by scientific research and must therefore be presented as conclusions that are 
for the most part provisional. But before these conclusions are presented, a central 
point of the analysis conducted so far will be revisited. 
An objection could be raised against the line of argument that has been presented, 
namely, that it creates the impression, despite asseverations to the contrary, that the 
function of television and the audience’s need to communicate, both of which are 
grounded in the societal structure, have a kind of pre-established harmony. Although 
the analysis sought to prevent this impression, it is worth to emphatically repeat 
again that the form, content and function of television and the communicative needs 
the audience places on its use value are as contradictory as the societal relations 
from which they originate and emerge. This also means that growing awareness of 
the contradictory nature of this relationship – and alongside this, growing insight into 
the nature of one’s own needs and the way television deals with these needs – de-
termines the audience’s ‘level of resistance’ [Widerborstigkeit] and the ‘manipulative 
power’ of the medium. The contradictory way in which emancipatory and compensa-
tory aspects coincide in the structure of the audience’s needs and interests, a con-
tradiction rooted in the class specific conditions of the audience’s life, can only truly 
give rise to a liberating praxis of communication if viewers are capable of initiating “a 
production of experience in dealing with one’s own needs” (Negt and Kluge 1993, 
124) “a process of producing experience that is rooted in an engagement with their 
own needs” (Ibid., 216) and, in doing so, begin to break through the capitalistic de-
termination of their way of life [Lebenspraxis]. In the television sector, this “process of 
producing experience that is rooted in an engagement with their own needs” must be 
aimed at the continual establishment of forms of communication (that help viewers to 
reflect on their interests and articulate their needs). To ensure that these forms of 
communication can be institutionalised and attain societal weight politically, it is ab-
solutely essential that this process of production is not merely anchored within organ-
ised televisual communication but outside of it, that is, in the struggle for a societal 
life in which the material processes shaping it are determined by its immediate pro-
ducers (in the broadest possible sense). Only after these decisive conditions are met, 
do viewers have the possibility to expose the actual anti-capitalistic cores that the 
needs and specific use values that shape their interaction with television contain. And 
it is through an examination of the objective and subjective constituents of their own 
consciousness and their own practice that viewers can expand their consciousness 
of this process by means of creative class solidarity, one that is directed against capi-
talist and monopolistic-capitalist modes of production and appropriation. 
In what follows, an alternative to the dominant mode of televisual communication 
will be considered, but such a discussion cannot be focused on a praxis of communi-
cation, but must rather concentrate on articulating goals for a communication politics 
[kommunikationspolitischen Programmatik]. Such a cautious approach is not only 
adopted because such alternative television praxis has not yet been studied scientifi-
cally and only exists in a rudimentary state (for instance, in the form of local commu-
nication work relating to specific parts of town and conducted with the help of VCR 
systems). Caution with regards to such communication-praxis (as broadly or narrowly 
it has been established) is primarily rooted in the following circumstance: the attempt 
to find and organise alternatives can only be evaluated in relation to a conception of 
a communicative-practice that is founded in social theory; a conception – in the form 
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of a political programme – that thematises an alternative television praxis as part of 
the concrete and deliberate negation of the dominant public sphere and its manifes-
tations and mechanisms. 
Because such a programme still needs to be developed, the following reflections 
seek to achieve a shift in attention, specifically,  
 
onto two crucial points: 1. Onto a new stage in capital’s ability to extract value. 
With the aid of production-related-public-spheres [Produktionsöffentlichkeiten] 
(e.g. multimedia), this new stage circumvents traditional forms of the market-
public, which at most subjected isolated human needs, interests and ideas to 
secondary exploitation, but which largely left the production process of labour 
untouched. This new stage now takes whole contexts of life as the raw materi-
al for the extraction of value. 2. Onto the formation of a proletarian public as a 
counter-public, which develops beneath but not in abstract negation of the 
middle-class public (Negt and Kluge 1974, 23-24). 
The last point – i.e., that the abstract negation of the so called middle class public 
must be avoided – can only be achieved, if what was just described as the proletari-
an counter-public and the constitution of this public is systematically linked up with 
political practical work and with the dominant media (in the present case this means 
the broadcasting institutions). For here, as well as the context of society as a whole, 
it is true that:  
 
[...] within bourgeois society, the society that rests on exchange value, there 
arise relations of circulation as well as of production which are so many mines 
to explode it. [...] [I]f we did not find concealed in society as it is the material 
conditions of production and the corresponding relations of exchange prereq-
uisite for a classless society, then all attempts to explode it would be quixotic. 
(Marx 1857/58, 159) 
The arguments presented in what follows aim to make a contribution to the “problem 
of linking up”, and in doing so they seek to assist the emergence of a televisual prac-
tice conducted by the workers and in the service of the workers in two senses: 1. 
Building on an analysis of televisual communication processes and organisations that 
take shape in the conditions of fully established capitalist modes of production, they 
seek to expose the necessity of a fundamental change in the dominant televisual 
praxis. It also seeks to translate the recognition of this necessity into suggestions for 
practical political work on and within the medium ‘television’. 2. The following discus-
sions seek to contribute to the further development of an alternative televisual praxis 
through an engagement with the current form of the (televisual) public and its mech-
anisms. But the current form is not understood to be a pre-stage that could lead to an 
‘improvement’ of this form and its mechanisms, but as a part of the connection that is 
concretely determined by the real-societal struggle for the assertion of the needs and 
interests that, with the support of working masses and their organisation, are the sole 
means by which societal progress can be forced and based upon (Kreimeier 1974, 
218-219).  
Televisual communication in the context of capitalistic mode of production and 
state monopoly: this means an indirect, and – at times – direct subsumption of a me-
dium of societal communication by the principle of state-backed capitalist extraction 
of value. This, in turn, means: capitalisation facilitated by the state, or at least, the 
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adoption and re-orientation of the crucial needs for communication, articulation and 
reflection belonging to those who enable societal life with the work of their hands and 
minds to ensure that these needs conform to capital. This separation of the workers – 
the immediate produces – from the articulation and corresponding satisfaction of their 
communicative needs, a separation enforced by the reign of capital and organised by 
the state, reflects the class segregation in capitalistic society: it is a consequence of 
the wedge that is inevitably driven between the workers, especially the working clas-
ses in the narrower sense, and the possibility of developing a form of societal life that 
corresponds to their needs. Thus, it is precisely here, in the principle of societalisa-
tion, that a socio-political struggle for the institution and organisation of televisual 
communication must see its point of departure. Today this point must no longer 
merely be seen as a possible point of departure, but as the necessary point of depar-
ture from which to consciously  
 
develop a plan for a form of societal production that can abolish the class 
based distinction of manual and intellectual labour, and, in doing so, to ensure 
that the common interest prevails over the finite interests of capital. This would 
lead to the possibility for a full expression of human personality in its corre-
sponding level of societal development across all “levels” of society (Holzkamp 
1973, 287). 
The development and emergence of an individual and collective emancipatory 
movement [Emanzipationsbewegung] is the prerequisite of the long-term aim pro-
posed here – to arrive at a situation in which the immediate producers consciously 
and collectively plan, organise and establish a form of societal production and socie-
tal life in general. Organised as a process of pragmatic and communicative appropri-
ation of societal reality, this movement needs to create the conditions in which this 
long-term aim can achieved. With the qualification of societal communication thus 
provided – it is a means by which the world is materially and symbolically appropriat-
ed, and in response to the need – especially of the immediate producers – of having 
to fight for this medium against the formative power and quality of a capitalistic ‘bour-
geois’ public, the following, by now almost proverbial principle for a politics of com-
munication has been deduced, especially in the context of broadcasting: 
 
[R]adio must be transformed from a distribution apparatus into a communica-
tions apparatus. The radio could be the finest possible communications appa-
ratus in public life, a vast system of channels. That is, it could be so, if it un-
derstood how to receive as well as to transmit, how to let the listener speak as 
well as hear, how to bring him into a network instead of isolating him. Follow-
ing this principle the radio should step out of the supply business and organize 
its listeners as suppliers. […] Should you consider this Utopian, then I ask you 
to reflect on the reasons why it is Utopian. (Brecht 2000/1932, 42-43). 
The development of ever newer possibilities for communication underlines that this 
is, technologically speaking, not a utopian demand; but that it must appear like a uto-
pian demand in a socio-political sense is clear from the present analysis. At present, 
both the technological feasibility of organising anticapitalistic forms of communication 
and the socio-political difficulties that arise whilst attempting this can be vividly illus-
trated by means of the emergence of so called cable-television: on the one hand, the 
technology of cable-television opens the possibility that television networks could 
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break out of their (state-run capitalistic) ‘supply status’; on the other hand, the practi-
cal implementation of cable television is threatening to lead to an at least partial per-
fection of the dominant way in which a public is produced (Thomas 1975, 6 ff.; 
Meißner 1975 12 ff.; Flottau 1975, 21 ff.).  
Although it is already today being treated with some resignation and the motto: “if 
the thing goes wrong, democracy will have lost a battle” (Thomas 11), the issue of 
cable television is (once again) emphatically raising the question about alternatives to 
the currently prevailing way of organising communication in general (and televisual 
communication in particular). Initially, the following general reflections should be at 
the centre of finding a response to this question:  
 
1. It is only by means of a successive ‘de-capitalisation’ of networks that the change 
in the television sector that is suggested here can take place – a change that 
would see the working class, the class, which enables societal life in the first 
place, determine the possibilities of communication, articulation and reflection that 
this sector represents. Such a development, however, can neither be equated to a 
voluntary cut through the Gordian knot, nor can it happen in isolation from an 
overarching struggle against capitalism and against the form of subjectivity capi-
talism creates in the working classes. 
2. The development that is gestured toward here is successive; it is an attempt to 
organise a progressive praxis of communication within networks that are shaped 
by capitalism. It seeks to organise an emancipatory praxis of communication that 
attains a relative distance to the direct influence of the capitalistic state and capi-
talistic economy, so it can then progress into a revolutionary praxis of communica-
tion. It is only during this phase that the working masses, in collaboration with 
those who produce communication, are in a position to appropriate the specific in-
tellectual and technological productive forces that shape the production of com-
munication (Weißenborn 168-169). 
3. The transformation of the predominant model of televisual communication in this 
manner in the interest of the working class, must take both the conditions of pro-
gramme-production and reception of television programmes into account. On the 
one side, it must refer to the contradiction that exists between the (quasi-)state 
mediated dimension of exchange value and the effect of capitalistic bureaucrati-
sation that shape the production of television, and, on the other side, it must refer 
to the anti-capitalistic needs of the audience that form the kernel of both individual 
and collective emancipation. 
4. Because of the extent to which the economy and the state are entwined in a fully 
established form of capitalism, one of the requirements to effect a change in the 
predominant model of communication is spontaneous action. By means of such 
actions, groups of viewers and producers of communication, preferably working 
together, and building on the everyday experience gained at work or during free 
time, must attempt to articulate the needs that can act as a basis for the develop-
ment of a practical critique of the televisual production of the public and the over-
all life-context (Prokop II). In addition to this, the transformation of the currently 
prevalent televisual practice depends on systematically organised communicative 
interventions that centre on these spontaneous actions. These interventions must 
be oriented by the overarching struggle for the organisation of societal life by its 
immediate producers and are to be embedded in the sector of societal labour and 
reproduction (i.e. the ‘leisure’ industry) as activities of communication-politics and 
communication-pedagogy. 
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5. Because of this, the transformation of the current televisual practice must simulta-
neously be approached on the level of (primarily) anti-capitalistic ‘citizen-
initiatives’ [Bürgerinitiativen] and also through trade union action and party politi-
cal discussions. It must be noted that the initiatives, actions and discussions will 
attain an anticapitalistic or even progressive character capable of overcoming and 
bursting TV-communication in its capitalistic form when these see themselves, as 
a matter of principle, in opposition to the dominant ‘bourgeois’ public sphere and 
its forms and mechanisms. 
 
Without the development of a proletarian public (the ‘public’ that is forced into 
existence by its immediate producers – H.H.) the manifestations of resistance 
that take shape also…serve to consolidate the system. If they do not advance 
the formation of proletarian experience, they absorb the substance of this ex-
perience. If this experience is not organised by the formation of a proletarian 
public, it generates the raw material that is appropriated by capital in a perpet-
ually new processes (Negt and Kluge 1974, 71). 
The points concerning the politics of communication that have been presented above 
are informed by this thesis. One needs to bear in mind, however, that the previous 
reflections deem it pivotal to recognise that the development and widening of a so 
called proletarian public is to be approached as a problem rooted in communication 
practices [ein kommunikationspraktisches Problem]. The proletarian public must here 
be taken into account both in its inherent separation from the forms and mechanisms 
of the established public, but also in its inevitable correlation to these forms and 
mechanisms. The upcoming problems can only be tackled if one takes this ‘connec-
tion-through-separation’ [Trennzusammenhang] (Haug) between proletarians and the 
capitalistic public into account to constitute discussion about the politics of communi-
cation (and an anticapitalistic praxis of communication). It is only after this that 1. an 
appropriate estimate of the (manifest and latent, organised as well as spontaneous) 
anticapitalistic public that has already been established should be made; 2. building 
on this estimate, a targeted, concrete negation of the dominate forms and mecha-
nisms of societal communication should be adopted, a negation that unfolds through 
the expansion of the institutional and organisational pre-conditions for the establish-
ment of an anticapitalistic public; and 3. the gradual foundation of a growing anticapi-
talistic public within institutional settings, a public that is a conscious, practical ex-
pression of the life-context of its immediate producers. 
The overarching conclusions to be drawn from the argument so far: The fight for 
the anticapitalistic transformation of televisual communication can and must also be 
developed within this particular sector – but this struggle can only be decided where 
the nerve of capitalist system can be struck: in the dispute over the organisation of 
material production. This, in turn, means that the actions and campaigns that are call-
ing for this transformation within the networks must be brought into a relation with the 
wider societal push for a situation in which societal life is shaped by its immediate 
producers. What makes this the vital precondition, is that the majority of the viewing 
public will only become an active part of discussions about the practices of communi-
cation, if it feels that it can actually determine and have a say in the everyday reality 
of work and living conditions. The need to combine the transformation of (televisual) 
communication with the struggle of all workers against their economic and political 
dependence has the following consequences for those who produce communication 
(the journalists, technicians and administrators): they must become organised, and 
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this means, initially, in trade unions, and, in addition to this, they must join the anti-
capitalistic movement of all workers that is to be established. 
With regards to the earlier distinction between a progressive, emancipatory praxis 
of communication and a revolutionary one, and in view of the current social-political 
situation in the German Federal Republic, this means that important political organi-
sations for the emergence of a progressive and emancipatory politics and praxis of 
communication are: the trade unions that make up the DGB (German Trade Union 
Confederation) as a whole, but within these, especially the Union of German Journal-
ists (DJU), which belongs to the Print and Paper union, and the Union of Broadcast-
ing, Television and Film (RFFU); Specific fractions of the SPD and FDP, especially 
the members of the Young-Socialists and Young-Democrats, must also be added 
here. The DKP (German Communist Party) must develop this progressive and 
emancipatory politics and praxis of communication further from a revolutionary per-
spective, as this party conducts a consistent anticapitalistic labour and employment 
policy, and as such, a politics that is consistently in the interest of the immediate pro-
ducers. 
Within these trade-union and party political organisations (and also in the ‘nascent-
forms’ of such organisations) it must be the job of those who produce communica-
tion, especially the journalists, to clarify and assert that their interests are in solidarity 
with those whose physical and intellectual labour sustains the existence of societal 
life in the first place, and in the service of those, for whom the means of communica-
tions ought to exist (to facilitate the participation in and emergence of societal life). 
These organisations should especially conceive of communication projects and strat-
egies for the politics of communication and realise these. These activities, which are 
preferably to be based on science, should only connect to the suggested and forced 
interests of the workers in order to stimulate and support the hidden desire for soli-
darity, cooperation and self-determination that these contain. 
Translated into specific political demands related to communication, demands, 
which are to be taken up by the organisations named above and, to various degrees, 
by pressure groups of various intensities, accentuation and perspectives that take 
shape spontaneously in confrontations with the dominant forms of televisual commu-
nication:  
 
1. The television sector must be controlled by representatives and organisations of 
the working population by means of effective rule over practical, technical, finan-
cial and staff matters. As a necessary prerequisite, the current organisational 
structure of networks must be fundamentally questioned. As part of this, the com-
position and competency of the governing bodies are to be reviewed and the staff 
council must equally be the focus of the dispute about the form and quality of in-
house cooperation. The demand that at least 50 per cent of the members of the 
governing bodies (administrative- and broadcasting boards and commissions) 
should be from trade union organisations and employee organisations of major 
corporations could provide a first impulse in this direction. 
2. The question about the form and quality of in-house co-operation must be raised 
in connection to the relationship between journalists, technicians and administra-
tors, but must equally be applied to the relationship these groups have to the gov-
erning and administrative boards of the broadcasting houses and the directorship 
(and the commissions this entails). The organisation of self-governing work-
collectives amongst those who produce communication could provide some first 
pointers for answers to these questions. This could lead to the establishment of a 
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committee in charge of programming and production that is carried by these col-
lectives. As part of this, one ought to also confront the multifaceted entanglements 
with the capitalistic economy that currently exist, the entanglements with advertis-
ing corporations are an obvious example in this respect. 
3. Because of the federal principle of the ARD [the state funded German Broadcast-
ing House], and to ensure that matters concerning the organisational structure of 
the in-house cooperation within broadcasting organisations can be raised in an 
adequate manner and pragmatically processed, advisory committees are to be 
established at county level. These are to comprise of elected representatives of 
the working public and organisations belonging to it, and they must have the right 
to pass bills. These committees also ought to be responsible for the coordination 
of activities and campaigns that are to varying degrees ‘unorganised’, and thus 
work under challenging material conditions.  
4. As they unfold, the listed activities must always refer to attempts to develop an 
anticapitalistic televisual praxis that is external to the prevailing forms and mecha-
nisms of communication. This praxis can be found 1. in contexts relating to social-
ist attempts to agitate in the context of elections, strikes, job cuts or pay negotia-
tions; 2. in the context of targeted local work in cities with the use of video record-
ers; 3. or in the context of educational courses and seminars offered by trade un-
ions and others. These activities must hereby not be viewed as efforts that must 
still be properly ‘channelled’; instead, it must be understood that these activities 
represent important opportunities to actually make the discussion of a medium of 
communication that creates abstract sociality concrete by means of a content 
specific experience, an experience gained in the (communicative) engagement 
with the practical everyday needs of humans.  
 
There is no need to go into the provisional and sketchy character of the short outline 
of a politics of communication provided here in any detail. The current state of the 
scientific and political engagement with this matter only allows for such fragmented 
articulation of the problematic. But in conclusion, the central reference points of both 
the scientific analysis and the political consequences deduced from this will be reiter-
ated. What then, where the overarching concerns? 
 
1. The argument sought to demonstrate that the television viewers, who (for the 
most part) belong to the class of the immediate producers of societal life, are the 
co-producers of ‘television’ as a medium. They are, however, ‘unconscious’ pro-
ducers, because the conscious and cooperative organisation of communication by 
the subjects of this communication is not possible under capitalistic conditions. 
2. The argument sought to demonstrate that in the course of the practical engage-
ment with the organisational and material qualities of the medium, the viewers, 
the working population as a whole, must grasp, what this medium is as a form-
specific, machinelike expression of the dominant societal conditions. They must 
also grasp why and how it acts upon and through the class specific needs of its 
‘unconscious’ but actual producers, needs that arise from the structure of society. 
3. The argument sought to demonstrate that the current form of televisual communi-
cation is an integral component of the overarching power relation. This power re-
lation may not remain unaffected by the (necessary) theoretical and practical 
problematisation of one of the communicative pillars that support it, but it can only 
be transformed in substance under one condition. To be transformed, the decisive 
principle which organises the material process of society – the illusory self-
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validation value attains when it takes the form of capital – must be made inopera-
tive, and with this, the subjection of living labour that this principle entails.  
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Postface: Horst Holzer’s “Communication & Society:  
A Critical Political Economy Perspective”  
Christian Fuchs 
Horst Holzer (1935-2000) contributed to establishing foundations of a Marxist theory 
of communication in the German-speaking world. He was the main representative of 
the approach of the critique of the political economy of media and communication in 
Germany. This approach has been “forgotten” in the German social sciences and 
German media and communication studies.  
This “forgetfulness” has structural reasons: The study of media and communica-
tion has in the German speaking world been particularly conservative and positivist. It 
is ironic that in the land of Habermas, critical media and communication studies has 
only existed on the fringes of the academic landscape. Habermas himself also did 
not hold a communication studies professorship, but was a full professor of philoso-
phy and sociology at the University of Frankfurt. Someone like Holzer, who much 
clearer than Habermas stood in the tradition of Karl Marx’s works, faced difficulties in 
this exceedingly conservative environment. Holzer was a member of the German 
Communist Party (DKP) and one of the first victims of the professional ban against 
communists. The appointment committee ranked Holzer first for a professorship of 
aesthetics and communication at the University of Bremen in 1971. The regional 
government denied his appointment, which triggered the introduction of the Germa-
ny-wide introduction of the professional ban against DKP members in 1972. Although 
Holzer was highly qualified and prolific, as well as an excellent theorist and research-
er, he never obtained a full professorship and was denied tenure at the Ludwig Max-
imilian University of Munich. In the country where Marx was born and where Hork-
heimer and Adorno made the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research world-famous, 
anti-Marxist repression, ideology and biases have structurally constrained the devel-
opment of Marxist communication studies. 
Despite these structural constraints, Horst Holzer has created an impressive oeu-
vre that studies communication in capitalism (see Fuchs 2017b for a more detailed 
discussion). The discrimination of Marxists can and should not be forgotten. At the 
same time, the best we can do today is to renew the tradition of Marxian communica-
tion studies. As part of this endeavour, tripleC has in 2017 published the English 
translation of an article by Holzer under the title “The Forgotten Marxist Theory of 
Communication & Society” (Holzer 2017). We continue in this manner by presenting 
another key work by Horst Holzer that we have here published under the title “Com-
munication & Society: A Critical Political Economy Perspective”.  
Christopher John Müller, who has made an excellent contribution to making for-
gotten approaches in the critical theory of technology and communication known by 
translating works of Günter Anders into English (see Müller 2016 and Anders 
2017/1958; see also Fuchs 2017a for an introduction to Anders), has conducted the 
translation of this work by Holzer from German into English. Denise Rose Hansen 
has provided excellent editorial support for preparing the texts for translation in or-
ganising its bibliography and referencing.  
The presented article consists of three chapters from Horst Holzer’s 1975 book 
“Theorie des Fernsehens” (Theory of Television). Holzer’s book is much more than a 
theory of television: It provides foundations of a Marxist theory of communication and 
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society. Marxists analyse society as a totality that is based on the dialectic of human 
practices and social structures and dialectics of society’s various moments. When 
studying a semiotic phenomenon such as television, radio, the Internet, social media, 
newspapers, culture, literature, jokes, satire, etc., Marxists therefore take an ap-
proach that analyses culture and communication in the context of society and its con-
tradictions, dynamics and struggles. Holzer’s approach is in this respect comparable 
to that of Raymond Williams, whose books Television (Williams 2003/1974) and 
Marxism and Literature (Williams 2009/1977) are not simply books about specific 
forms of information and communication but also theoretical engagements with 
communication and culture in capitalism.  
In the present work, Holzer makes clear that a historical-materialist analysis of 
communication situates communication in the context of the actual life-process, the 
mode of production, material relations, working conditions, human practices, political 
conditions, culture and ideologies.  
A particularly important issue is in this context is the question of how to think of 
the relationship between communication and work. Four different approaches exist 
for solving this question (see Fuchs 2016, Chapter 6). Economic reductionism as-
sumes that communication and culture form a superstructure that, in the last in-
stance, is determined by an economic base that includes work organisation and la-
bour practices. Cultural reductionism (which e.g. can be found in many postmodern 
approaches) inverts the base-superstructure model and sees culture and the world of 
signs as society’s base. It reduces the explanation of the economy to the semiotic 
realm. Dualist approaches (such as Habermas’ theory of communicative action) view 
communication and work as two separate and independent realms of society. The 
problem of these three approaches is that they underestimate the simultaneous inter-
relatedness and relative autonomy of society’s moments.  
The fourth approach stands in the tradition of Hegelian Marxism’s dialectical phi-
losophy. Holzer’s analysis belongs to this fourth type of tradition. In dialectical philos-
ophy, the world is dynamic, relational and contradictory. One entity can only exist in-
itself (being-for-itself) by being related to another entity (being-for-another). Two re-
lated forms of existence are different and identical at the same time, which consti-
tutes a contradiction, out of which potentials for development and differentiation 
emerge. For Holzer, production is the essential feature of humans and society. There 
is a dialectic of work and production, in which “humans produce communicatively and 
communicate productively”. Work and production are both human production pro-
cesses that presuppose and require each other and are specific forms of production. 
Communication is the process in which humans produce and reproduce social rela-
tions, social structures, social systems, institutions, society as a whole, and therefore 
sociality as such. Humans communicate based on a dialectic of structures and prac-
tices, in which communication is the mediating process. Work is not an isolated but a 
social activity and relation. Work therefore requires communication for its organisa-
tion. Holzer’s dialectical approach to communication and work is comparable to those 
of Georg Lukács, Raymond Williams, and Lucien Goldmann (see Fuchs 2016, Chap-
ter 2; Fuchs 2017c; Fuchs 2018).  
Holzer makes clear in the work at hand that a Marxist theory of communication 
situates and analyses communication in the context of capitalism, i.e. structures and 
practices of capital accumulation, class relations, the exploitation of labour, domina-
tion, state power, ideology. He stresses the importance of commodity fetishism in 
Marxian analysis. Fetishism results in ideologies such as price consciousness, per-
formance, competition, merit, and the appearance of the private sphere as autono-
400  Christian Fuchs 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2018. 
mous from alienation and as shaped by interpersonal sympathy. Commodity fetish-
ism as constitutive principle of capitalism also creates “the communicative character 
of commodities and the commodity character of communication” that form the “basis 
for an illusory synthesis of society as a whole.” A synthesis, that “is illusory because it 
does not result from an a consciously and collectively organised interaction with na-
ture, but is merely an expression of a mode of production, in which the societalisation 
of working subjects only ever happens retroactively [nachträglich], only after work 
has been done, so to speak” (Holzer 2018, 384). So in capitalism, we find a dialectic 
of fetishism and ideological communication.  
A Marxist approach also identifies and strives to inform social struggles for alterna-
tives. Holzer shows that a Marxist theory of communication in this context takes on 
the role of analysing potentials for alternatives to capitalist communications. Holzer 
situates alternative media in the context of class and social struggles. Based on Os-
kar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1993), he argues for the alternative use of television 
in order to constitute a proletarian public sphere. Based on Bertolt Brecht 
(2000/1932), he argues for television to be turned into a communications system in 
which viewers become producers. The goal would be the “de-capitalisation” of com-
munications. Holzer stresses that it is decisive that alternative media are embedded 
into the praxis of progressive movements, unions and parties. Holzer’s insights are 
guided by Marx’s (1842, 175) categorical communication imperative that the “primary 
freedom of the press lies in not being a trade”. 
Horst Holzer’s approach remains highly topical today. He shows that a critical so-
ciology of communication analyses communication in society, communication in capi-
talism, potential pathways and struggles towards alternative, non-capitalist forms of 
communication. 43 years after the publication of the work, capitalist communication is 
dominated by corporations such as Apple (the world’s 9th largest transnational cor-
poration in 2017), AT&T (#11), Samsung Electronics (#15), Verizon Communications 
(#18), Microsoft (#19), China Mobile (#21), Alphabet/Google (#24), Comcast (#31), 
Nippon Telegraph & Telephone (#37), Softbank (#38), IBM (#43), Intel (#54), Cisco 
Systems (#58), Walt Disney (#67), Oracle (#70), Deutsche Telekom (#77), Amazon 
(#83), Hon Hai Precision (#98), Telefónica (#110), Facebook (#119) (data sources: 
Forbes 2000 List of the World’s Biggest Public Companies for the year 2017). These 
global corporations operate in the areas of media technology hardware, computer 
software, the Internet, telecommunications, semiconductors, and digi-
tal/communication services. Specifically, they operate in the capital accumulation 
realms of computer hardware (Apple), semiconductors (Samsung Electronics, Intel), 
software (Microsoft, Oracle), communications equipment (Cisco), telecommunica-
tions (AT&T, Verizon Communications, China Mobile, Nippon Telegraph & Tele-
phone, Softbank, Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica), electronics assemblage (Hon Hai 
Precision), digital and online services (Alphabet/Google, IBM, Amazon, Facebook), 
broadcasting (Comcast, Walt Disney). 
20 out of the world’s 120 largest transnational corporations (16.7%) operate in the 
communications sector, which shows that capitalism to a significant degree is com-
municative capitalism, digital capitalism, and at the same time also finance capital-
ism, hyper-industrial capitalism, mobility capitalism, etc. Diverse forms of the exploita-
tion of labour and the production and dissemination of ideology operate in and 
through diverse communications industries. The task of Marxist communication stud-
ies today is to analyse how digital and communicative capitalism works, what role it 
plays in capitalism as totality, what its contradictions look like, how they are experi-
enced, and how struggles for alternative communications and alternative communi-
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cations themselves operate. Horst Holzer’s works remain an important inspiration for 
this task.  
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